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Summary 
As the observer of international peace and security, the UNSC has the 
power to decide upon what constitutes of a threat to world peace. By 
adopting Resolutions, the UNSC creates binding decisions that must be 
pursued by all members of the UN. Article 103 UN states that the UN 
Charter prevail over any other treaty obligation, why the EU must follow the 
decisions of the UNSC due to the obligations of its Member States. 
Consequently, the EU must implement the UN Resolutions in EC 
Regulations which become legally binding upon its Member States. 
Moreover, the EU has the power to decide upon sanctions of its own 
through its Common Foreign and Security Policy. The primacy of the UN 
Charter can create complex situations for countries like Sweden, who is a 
member of the UN but also a Member State of the EU. Not only are the 
Member States legally bound by the EC Regulations, but they must also 
observe the decisions of the UNSC.      
 
This thesis has its starting-point in the judgment by the CFI in the Yusuf 
case where a Swedish citizen, Mr. Yusuf, and an entity based in Sweden, the 
Al Barakaat Foundation, have their financial assets frozen due to an EC 
Regulation implementing a UNSC Resolution. The practice of blacklisting 
individuals through targeted sanctions is a result of the fight against 
terrorism carried out by the UN. The practice of targeting individuals on 
blacklists has been an issue of much controversy since the individuals have 
no right to be heard or to examine the evidence against him. These 
fundamental rights that are protected both in the Swedish constitution as 
well as by the EU are constantly being neglected by the international 
community in the fight against terrorism. The case of the Swedish citizen 
Mr. Yusuf was no exception.  
 
The CFI judged that in fact the right to a fair hearing and judicial review is a 
fundamental right protected in the EU, but that it was unable to review the 
EC Regulation since it had merely implemented the UN Resolution. The 
supremacy of the UN Charter and the fear of underminig the role of the 
UNSC were key factors in the judgment. However, the CFI was capable of 
reviewing the Regulation from a perspective of compliance to peremptory 
norms of jus cogens. After having conducted a proportionality test, the CFI 
states that neither did the Regulation and the freezing of the funds breach 
the applicants’ right to a fair hearing, nor the right to judicial review.   
 
The EU will accede to the ECHR when the Lisbon Treaty will come into 
force and hopfully the fundamental rights will have a more secure status in 
the Community legal system. The international situation also calls upon the 
members of the UN to demand the adherence to fundamental rights, or else 
the fight against terrorism will lose all credibility and the  ‘war on terror’ 
will never be won.  
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Sammanfattning 
Som övervakare av internationell fred och säkerhet har FN:s Säkerhetsråd 
(SäkR) den yttersta makten att bedöma vad eller vilka situationer som utgör 
ett hot mot fred i världen. Genom att anta Resolutioner, skapar SäkR 
bindande beslut som måste beaktas och efterlevas av samtliga FN:s 
medlemmar. Som ett resultat av FN-stadgans (FNSt) företräde framför alla 
andra traktat, enligt Artikel 103 FN, måste både EU:s och FN:s 
medlemsstater följa SäkR-resolutioner. EU är dessutom skyldig att 
implementera SäkR-resolutioner genom egna EG- förordningar vilka sedan 
får bindande verkan för EU:s medlemsstater.  FNSts företräde över alla 
andra traktat kan ge upphov till komplexa situationer för länder som Sverige 
som dels är medlemmar av FN men även av EU. EU:s medlemsstater är inte 
enbart bundna av EG-förordningar, utan även av de resolutioner som SäkR 
beslutat om.     
 
Den här examensuppsatsen tar avstamp i Förstainstansrättens dom i Yusuf-
fallet. Yusuf, som var svensk medborgare, samt den Sverige-baserade 
ekonomiska organisationen Al Barakaat, fick sina ekonomiska tillgångar 
frysta genom en EG-förordning som implementerade en SäkR-resolution. 
Yusuf och Al Barakaat blev svartlistade av FN genom riktade sanktioner. 
Tillämpningen av svartlistor genom riktade sanktioner har varit föremål för 
mycket kritik eftersom de individer och organisationer som hamnat på 
listorna inte har fått rätten att bli hörda eller att ta del av bevisning 
tillgodosedd. Dessa grundläggande fri- och rättigheter, som åtnjuter skydd 
både i svensk grundlag och av EU, försummas totalt av det internationella 
samfundet i kampen mot terrorism. Yusuf-fallet var inget undantag i det 
hänseendet. 
 
Förstainstansrätten slog fast i sin dom att även om man ansåg att rätten till 
en rättvis prövning och lagprövningsrätten utgjorde grundläggande fri- och 
rättigheter enligt EG-rätten så var domstolen inte behörig att döma över 
dessa rättigheter eftersom det egentligen var fråga om SäkR-resolution som 
endast hade implementerats genom en EG-förordning. FNSts företräde samt 
rädslan att underminera SäkRs makt var de två viktigaste faktorerna som 
domstolen åberopade i sitt försvar. Inte heller ansågs förordningen strida 
mot jus cogens. 
 
Ett steg mot att säkerställa respekten för de grundläggande fri- och 
rättigheterna i framtiden kan vara EU:s anslutning till EKMR genom 
Lissabonfördraget. Det är också viktigt att FN:s medlemmar sätter press på 
FN att respektera rättigheterna och för FN att efterleva kraven på respekten. 
Annars riskerar FN att mista mycket av sin trovärdighet i kampen mot 
terrorismen och ’kriget mot terrorn’ riskerar att förloras.   
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Preface 
 
 
(…) A society that violates the rights of its citizens cannot expect them to cultivate their 
talents at home, or to contribute to their nation’s prosperity, or to develop their own 
communities. Without the rule of law, without the protection of the individual, and without 
the end to corrupt practices, societies cannot sustain in the long run.1   
 
 
 
I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Gudmundur Alfredsson, for 
his good support and for being a committed supervisor. I would also like to 
thank Mr. Anders Kruse, Director for the EU Legal Secretariat at the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs for inspiring me to write this thesis.  
 
Finally, I would like to thank everyone in my family, especially my parents, 
for your continuous support. Your support and belief in my talent has helped 
me push forward and accomplish much in my life.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Petter Lycke 
 
Lund, 11 June 2008 
                                                 
1 Former UN Secretary General Mr. Kofi Annan in his address marking the 50th anniversary 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 8th of December, 1998.  
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Abbreviations 
 
AG  Advocate General 
The Community The European Community 
Council  The Council of the European Union  
CFI  The Court of First Instance 
EC  Treaty Establishing the European Community 
ECHR European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as 
amended by Protocol No. 11 
ECJ  European Court of Justice 
ECtHR The European Court of Human Rights 
EU  European Union 
EUCFR  Charter of Fundamental Rights for the European 
  Union 
ICL  International Law Commission 
ICTY the International Tribunal on War Crimes in 
Former Yugoslavia  
 
Member States Member States of the EU 
RF  Regeringsformen (Instrument of Government) 
TEU  Treaty Establishing the European Union 
UDHR  Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
UN  United Nations 
UN, or UN Charter Charter of the United Nations   
UNGA  United Nations General Assembly 
Union  European Union 
UNSC  United Nations Security Council 
VCLT  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Introduction to the Topic 
 
September 11 changed the world in many ways. From an International Law 
perspective the situation gave rise to a number of new issues which had 
never been dealt with before. For the international community the incident 
gave rise to a universal fear of terrorism and widespread suspicion towards 
Muslims and the ‘war on terror’ became a well-recognized notion. The 
significance of self-defense ‘if an armed attack occurs’ which is found in 
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) changed when 
the US and its allies decided to invade Iraq without the consent of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Important fundamental rights that 
once were considered sacred are now outweighed by the necessity to fight 
terrorism.  
 
In 1999 the UNSC adopted Resolution 1267 in which it condemned the fact 
that Afghan territory continued to be used for the sheltering and training of 
terrorists and planning of terrorist acts. Paragraph 4 (b) of the resolution 
provides that all the member states of the UN must: 
 
Freeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or generated from 
property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any undertaking owned 
or controlled by the Taliban, as designated by the Committee established by paragraph 6 below, 
and ensure that neither they nor any other funds or financial resources so designated are made 
available, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the 
Taliban or any undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban, except as 
may be authorized by the Committee on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of humanitarian 
need;2      
 
A Committee was set up by mandate of the Resolution to make sure the 
States effectively implement the measures imposed by paragraph 4 of the 
Resolution and to make periodic reports to the UNSC. Since every member 
of the UN is bound by Article 103 UN Charter, the Resolution must be 
implemented by virtue of its own nature.3  
 
On the 14th of February 2000 the EU Council adopted Regulation No 
337/2000 EC concerning a freeze of funds and other financial resources in 
respect of the Taliban regime of Afghanistan on the basis of Articles 60 
Treaty Establishing the European Communities (EC) and 301 EC. Every 
Member State of the EU was now also legally bound by the EU to 
implement the measures.4  
                                                 
2 S/RES/1267 (1999) para 4 (b); Judgement of the Court of First Instance in Case T-306/01 
(2005), Yusuf Case (Yusuf), para., 10. 
3 S/RES/1267 (1999) para., 6; Charter of the United Nations, Article 103. 
4 Yusuf, para., 13. 
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By a new resolution by the UNSC 1333 from 2000, the Committee was 
instructed by the UNSC to maintain and update a list of persons and entities 
designated as associated with Usama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda. This list was 
subsequently adopted by the EU through Regulation No 467/2001 replacing 
Regulation 337/2000.5   
 
Among several names and entities on the list provided by Regulation No 
467/2001 was the Swedish citizen Ahmed Ali Yusuf. Mr.Yusuf was 
together with two other Swedish citizens and a financial entity called the Al 
Barakaat International Foundation blacklisted by the UNSC for suspected 
connections to Al Qaeda. Eventually, however, the two other citizens were 
removed from the list by the UNSC in 2002.6 Mr. Yusuf and the Al 
Barakaat contested the legality of the Regulation and filed for an appeal 
before the Court of First Instance (CFI). This is the case most commonly 
referred to as the case of the ‘Somali Swedes’.     
 
The UNSC Resolutions as well as the EC Regulations are carried out 
without a proper trial nor are the individuals enclosed on the list given an 
opportunity to pronounce oneself on the issue. Clearly this would be a 
violation of the right to a fair hearing expressed in both the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) Article 6 as well as the Article 10 of the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights (UDHR).7 The incident of Mr. Yusuf is in no way a one-off, 
but follows a practice established by the world legal order and where neglect 
for individuals’ fundamental rights is accepted. Sweden is no exception to 
this practice and is in fact obliged to carry out the decisions of both the EU 
as well as the UN due to its treaty obligations.  
 
 
1.2 Subject and Purpose 
 
In this thesis, I will seek to examine whether the practice of blacklisting 
individuals is in compliance with the protection of fundamental rights as 
expressed inter alia in the ECHR and the constitutions of the EU Member 
States.8 The starting-point of this research is to analyze the obligations of a 
Member State as party both to the UN Charter and the Treaties of the EC 
and EU. The Yusuf case is an obvious example of a situation where a 
Member State, in this case Sweden, is obliged to follow not only EU law, 
but also international law under e.g. the UN Charter. Moreover, Sweden is 
bound by its own constitution where the protection for fundamental rights is 
clearly stated.9  
                                                 
5 Ibid. para., 14 ff. 
6 Ibid. para., 24 ff. 
7 See ECHR, Article 6; UDHR, Article 10. 
8 See inter alia the Right to a fair trial in Article 6 ECHR.  
9 RF 2 kap. (Swedish Instrument of Government Act, Chapter 2)  
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The overall purpose of the thesis is therefore to clear up the difficulties of 
the right strike between the right balance between the effectiveness in the 
fight against terrorism and protection of fundamental rights. The main 
research questions are as follows;  
 
1. Are the UNSC Resolutions in accordance with Sweden’s obligations 
to respect fundamental rights under international law and EU law? 
 
2. Are the EC Regulations or Common Positions in accordance with 
Sweden’s obligations towards the European Union? 
 
3. Is there any way to limit the impact of the UNSC in the international 
legal order? 
 
4. What are the means for redress for Mr Yusuf and/or Al Barakaat and 
what can we expect in the future? 
 
 
 
1.3 Definitions and Delimitations 
 
The ‘War of Terror’ is remarkable in the sense that it is a war with no 
clearly identified parties. Roughly, one could say that the US with the UK 
and its allies has declared war on terrorism. The problem is that terrorism is 
no state or regime, but consists of anyone or any organization involved in 
acts of terror. If there is a war, textually, the rules of war in international 
humanitarian law ought to apply. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was clearly a 
case of war as defined in the Third Geneva Convention from 1949, Article 
2.10 However, for those other individuals or groups of individuals or entities 
that are subjected to sanctions it remains unclear whether the same rights of 
humanitarian law applies for them.  
                                                 
10 In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace time, the present 
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which 
may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is 
not recognized by one of them.  
 
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of 
a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resistance.  
 
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the 
Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They 
shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter 
accepts and applies the provisions thereof.  
 
See, Article 2 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
adopted on 12 August 1949 in Geneva.;  
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The rules of international humanitarian law apply to armed conflicts. The 
Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal on War Crimes in Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) defined the notion of armed conflict in the Tadic case.11  
 
The Appeals Chamber laid down that: 
 
an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or 
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 
between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation 
of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion 
of peace is reached;12
 
By this definition, it seems like the ‘war on terror’ could fit both the 
occupation and intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. The individuals who 
are, or have been, subjected to UNSC sanctions, could be said to carry out 
actions of war if one would make a far-reaching interpretation and state that 
they assist in carrying out the actions of terror, thus forming part of the 
notion of terrorism as a whole. However, I will not go deeper into analyzing 
the definition of terrorism, but simply attempt to illustrate the complexity of 
the notion of the ‘war on terror’.   
 
In this work, I refer to the ‘war on terror’ as the war on terrorism, without 
going further deeper into the consequences the denotation ‘war’ has on the 
parties concerned. Like many other scholars, the ‘war on terror’ is used 
simply as a reference to describe an ongoing condition in the fight against 
terrorism; though, I am not intending to give the concept a greater 
significance.   
 
The second definition that needs to be emphasized is the using of the notion 
of fundamental rights. Since the starting point of this thesis is Sweden and 
its obligations to the EU and the UN, I will not refer to basic human rights. 
The focus lies on individuals who are citizens of Sweden and thus, of the 
EU. Both Sweden and the EU are legitimate polities based on certain agreed 
values. These values are fundamental rights and create a basic point of 
reference against which all norms shall be reviewed.13  
 
After having elucidated the main concepts, it is appropriate to present the 
delimitations.  
 
Considering the possible width of the topic the thesis, I am forced to narrow 
down the subject in as much as possible. The thesis is first and foremost a 
study on the protection of fundamental rights within the EU context. Since 
the subject requires also an in depth analyze of factors of international law, I 
                                                 
11 Shaw, Malcolm N, International Law 5th ed. Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 1069. 
12 Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction from 2 October 
1995 in the Tadic case (IT-94-1), para. 70.   
13 Lindfelt, Mats Fundamental Rights in the European Union – Towards Higher Law of the 
Land? A Study of the Status of Fundamental Rights in a Broader Constitutional Setting, 
Åbo Akademi University Press, 2007, p. 12. 
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will extend the study to include aspects of the UN, the UNSC and rules of 
customary international law. However, I have chosen not to become 
absorbed into other issues of international law such as state responsibility or 
the right to self-defence. I have further decided not to extend the scope of 
this study to include the possible review of the ICJ on UNSC Resolutions. 
This is simply due to the lack of space, even if I believe it is of interest, even 
for this study. Moreover, I will not go deeper into other possible ways to 
limit the power of the UNSC by entering a possible discussion on how to 
reform the whole UN system, as this would extend the scope of the thesis 
far too much for obvious reasons. I will instead emanate from the existing 
limitations on the UNSC in my discussion and simply mention some 
possible, less radical changes.  
 
1.4 Method and Disposition 
There are several legal research methods and the specific topic in this thesis 
could probably be examined in as many ways. Peter Westberg elaborates 
two important methodological methods to do legal research, the ‘rule-
oriented approach’ and the ‘problem- or interest oriented approach’.14  
 
The ‘problem- or interest oriented approach’ aims at describing a legal 
system without having a starting point in legal rules. The method is 
characterized by a more open approach, in the sense that it aspires to widen 
the field of sight beyond the law.15 The problem I intend to examine is 
primarily a legal issue; however it is at the same time a highly political topic 
and requires a discussion beyond legal rules to fully understand the major 
dilemma.  
 
The reference to politics, the critical analysis of the case-law of the CFI as 
well as the future aspects on the protection of fundamental rights does not 
imply that there is no reference to the law in the field of EU- and 
International law, de lege lata. The part on EU law as well as International 
law and Swedish national legislation describes legal systems, de lege lata. It 
is important to emphasize that the described rules are not seen as absolute, 
but in fact dependant upon aspects such as the international political 
situation. Nevertheless, it is the non descriptive parts such as the future 
aspects and the political debate, de lege ferenda that suggests that this thesis 
has more of a ‘problem- or interest oriented approach’.  
 
The thesis is set up around the Yusuf case and the different aspects of the 
judgment are dealt with in the main Chapters, 2 and 3, with analysis of EU- 
and international law respectively. The two last Chapters intend to give a 
broader view of the problem and possible changes for the future. Each main 
Chapter is based around one of the research questions. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
14 Westberg Peter Avhandlingsskrivande och val av forskningsansats – en idé om 
rättsvetenskaplig öppenhet in Festskrift till Per-Olof Bolding, 1992, Juristförlaget, p. 423.   
15 Ibid., pp. 423 and 426.  
 9
throughout the thesis I have added rhetorical questions in an attempt to 
guide the reader forward and create a logical consistency. These rhetorical 
questions should not be mistaken for the main research questions, presented 
in Chapter 1.2 above.      
 
Chapter two of the thesis intends to give a broader understanding of the 
rules of EU law that regulates the foreign policy of the EU and its 
relationship to the UN and international law. The Chapter also seeks to 
examine the case-law of the CFI and the ECJ with a critical mindset so as to 
establish a possible pattern for future judgments.  
 
Chapter three deals with international law and aims at clarifying the present 
system of sanctions and the possibility to limit the power of the UNSC, but 
also reviews the ways in which international law could be said to have 
modified.  
 
Chapter four provides for the future aspects on the protection of 
fundamental rights and enters a discussion on how the fundamental rights 
can be protected in the EU when the Lisbon Treaty comes into force. The 
Chapter also attempts to give some solutions for the future securing of 
fundamental rights.  
 
Finally, Chapter five starts off with a review of Swedish national legislation 
to implement UN Resolutions and Common Positions of the EU to finalize 
in a political debate where a multitude of scholars and their views on the 
problem are highlighted.              
 
1.5 Materials 
The broad and relatively new topic required a wide range of materials. I 
have mainly used primary sources of law, such as various Treaties such as 
the Treaties of the EU and the EC, the UN Charter and Conventions for the 
more descriptive parts. Other sources of primary international law have been 
international case-law and the UNSC Resolutions.16  Sources of secondary 
EC law such as the EC Regulations and decisions have also been vital for 
the description of the problem.  
 
As regards doctrine, there are not many books written on the topic, yet. 
Perhaps the continuing debate and the fact that the issue is relatively new 
make the writing of longer publications difficult. When it comes to articles 
in legal journals there seems to be more activity. I have had great help from 
various articles in legal journals. These articles have been available over the 
internet through the library of the Faculty of Law at the University of Lund. 
It was important to find a great variety of authors and to find the most recent 
                                                 
16 See International Law – Primary Sources found at Suffolk University Law School 
Library, available at: http://www.law.suffolk.edu/library/research/a-z/resguides/intl.cfm  
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ones to give the thesis a sense of accuracy. Since the topic is current and 
still a source of much debate there was a multitude of articles to chose from.  
 
Because the thesis is not a strict legal dogmatic thesis, I have used other 
sources of material such as various blogs and homepages found on the 
internet. Among the latter sources, the homepages of international 
organizations such as the UN are the most reliable ones. Despite the lack of 
reliability in political blogs, I found it to be interesting to bring the opinions 
of scholars outside of the formal framework to the spotlight.17       
                                                 
17 See Joanne Scott in the International Economic Law and Policy Blog, available at: 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2006/04/index.html   
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2 EU Law 
2.1 The relationship between the EU and 
the UN 
2.1.1 Introductory remarks 
The relationship between the Member States of the EU and the UN is 
somewhat complex. While EC law prevails over the national law of the 
member states of the EU, the Charter of the UN prevails over any other 
international treaty.18 For a country like Sweden the dilemma is obvious 
when considering the fact that Sweden is not only a member of the EU but 
also a member of the UN. When the UNSC so decides upon a matter it 
considers to be a threat to international peace and security, the world must 
obey.19 So what do countries like Sweden do when there’s a conflict 
between its obligations to the UN and the various international treaties that 
Sweden has ratified20?  
 
2.1.2 Obligations of the Member States of the 
EU to the UN 
 
The answer could be found in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) Articles 30 and 41. According to these provisions, the UN 
Charter takes precedence, in case of conflict, over all, at a later date, 
contracted agreements relative to the UN Charter between any of the UN 
members, such as the ECHR. For those members being parties first to the 
ECHR and later to the UN Charter, the Charter will prevail in case of 
conflict due to the obligation in Article 103 of the UN Charter. All member 
states of the EU are also members of the UN and consequently, the EU 
member states cannot claim to have acted in accordance with the ECHR 
when failing to comply with binding UNSC Resolutions.21  
 
Nevertheless, Article 6 (2) TEU confirms that fundamental rights are 
protected as general principles of Community law as they derive from the 
                                                 
18 Judgement of the court in Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585, 593; 
Article 103 UN.    
19 Charter of the United Nations, Articles 24, 25 and 103.  
20 See inter alia the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11, ratified in 1953, Lysén Göran,  
Targeted UN Sanctions: Application of Legal Sources and Procedural Matters in Nordic 
Journal of International Law 72, 2003: p. 292. 
21 Lysén Göran,  Targeted UN Sanctions: Application of Legal Sources and Procedural 
Matters in Nordic Journal of International Law 72, 2003: p. 292. 
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ECHR and the common constitutional traditions of the member states.22 The 
provision codified the case-law of the ECJ and turned it into an imperative 
that the courts of the EU are mandated and instructed to enforce. There exist 
no other provisions in either the EC or the EU Treaty that contain 
derogations from the obligation to respect fundamental rights. This means 
that there are no provisions expressly stating that fundamental rights may be 
derogated from where this is necessary to respect international law or, 
especially, UNSC Resolutions.23  
 
The relationship between the EU and its member states is yet another factor 
that affects the relationship between the EU and the UN. The issue of pre-
accession human rights obligations for the member states of the Union is 
included in Article 307 EC. According to Article 307 EC all agreements 
concluded before acceding to the EU between one or more member states 
and one or several third states shall not be affected by the provisions of the 
EC Treaty. If however the obligations only concerned member states of the 
EU then Community law must take priority by virtue of the principle of 
loyalty in Article 10 EC, even when these treaties were created prior to their 
entry into the EU. To sum up, Member States legal obligations towards third 
states continue to exist even after they join the EU.24  
 
Article 307 EC by itself permits states to breach EU law, but read together 
with Article 103 of the UN Charter, however, Article 307 EC in fact obliges 
the Member States to breach EU law where this conflicts with the 
obligations deriving from the UN Charter.25  
 
The EU is not, as an intergovernmental organization, a signatory to the UN 
Charter, whereas its Member States are. This issue will be discussed more 
thorough later in this paper, but it is worth mentioning the problem at this 
point.26 While the EU as such is not bound by the UN, it could not carry out 
decisions contradictory to the UNSC since that would clearly undermine the 
authority of the UNSC.27 The nature of the UN Charter as prevailing any 
other international treaty also implies that the EU could not act contrary to 
the UN Charter.28  
 
                                                 
22 See Eeckhout Piet, Commuity Terrorism Listings, Fundamental Rights and UN Security 
Council Resolutions. In Search of the Right Fit, European Constitutional Law Review 3, 
2007, p. 198 and Article 6 (2) TEU.   
23 Eeckhout, p. 198. 
24 Tawhida Ahmed and Israel de Jesús Butler, The European Union and Human Rights: An 
International Law Perspective, The European Journal of International Law Vol 17 no. 4, 
2006, p. 784 ff. 
25 Ibid. p. 788. 
26 See under Chapters 2.2.1 Introductory Remarks and  2.2.3 Judgment of the CFI  
27 See “Different Attitudes in Euroepan Courts to International Law” by Joanne Scott, June 
2006 from the International Economic Law and Policy Blog available at: 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2006/04/index.html
28 Charter of the United Nations, Article 103. 
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That leaves us with the problem of how to secure fundamental rights in the 
EU and how its Member States can live up to their own constitutional 
obligations regarding the respect for fundamental rights?  
 
2.1.3 The Common Foreign and Security Policy 
As regards primary law of the EU, the respect for fundamental rights is 
expressly mentioned in Article 11(1) of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Union (TEU).29 In the same article there is a direct referral to the 
UN Charter. The article specifically states that the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) shall have as the objective: 
 
  to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the 
Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter 
 
(…) 
 
to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the 
United Nations Charter(/…)30     
 
It is the Council that defines the principles and general guidelines for the 
CFSP. The Council also decides upon the common strategies for the Union 
including joint actions and common positions for the EU member states.31   
 
The Commission is also involved in the work of the CFSP in that it enjoys a 
right of policy initiative. The Commission and the Council are also jointly 
responsible for the consistency of  EU external relations regarding inter alia 
humanitarian and sanctions regulations.32  
 
 
2.2 The legal framework for the 
implementation of EC Regulations      
 
The Community law-making process is quite extensive and could probably 
make up of a paper of its own. Therefore I will only briefly go through the 
basic procedure the Community applies when adopting the Regulations at 
issue in this paper. 
                                                 
29 “The Union shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy covering 
all areas of foreign and security policy, the objectives of which shall be: /…/ - to develop 
and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms”, see Article 11 (1) TEU.   
30 Article 11(1) TEU. 
31 External Relations – Common Foreign and Security Policy, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm#2 , see also Articles 13 to 15 
TEU. 
32 See External Relations – Common Foreign and Security Policy, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm#2  
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 When the EU implements its regulations the foundational provision is 
Article 249 EC. The article gives the institutions of the EU the possibility to 
act jointly to make regulations. The EU Parliament with the Council, or the 
Commission with the Council, makes regulations that have general 
application and are binding and directly applicable in all Member States.  
 
Since regulations have a supra national nature, every regulation must be 
entered into all national legal systems. This must be either by the national 
system transferring the measure into national law, or by a shorter national 
act adopting the relevant international act. The directly applicable nature of 
the regulations also bring that regulations are part of the national legal 
systems without the need for transformation or adoption by separate 
national legal measures.33  
 
After the adoption of the Treaty Establishing the European Union (TEU), 
the new three pillar structure provided for a more intergovernmental and 
less supranational decision-making structure. However the pillars are not 
completely disconnected from one another since much of the decision-
making involves the institutions of the Community, e.g. the decisions on 
common positions through the CFSP.34    
 
2.3 Case T-306/01, the Yusuf Case 
2.3.1 Introductory remarks 
 
The Yusuf Case is significant since the CFI states that the EU was 
competent to enact regulations for the freezing of funds for persons alleged 
to be associated with Al-Qaeda and Usama bin Laden. On the other hand the 
CFI did not consider itself to be able to review the legality of these acts 
merely in the light of EU’s general principles for the protection of human 
rights. A review on the grounds of the previously mentioned principles 
would impair an indirect review of the UNSC Resolutions and since the UN 
Charter has primacy over EC law that would also undermine the authority 
and uniformity of the acts of the UNSC. As a consequence, the CFI decided 
it could only review the legality in the light of the conformity of the 
regulations with the norms of jus cogens since these norms are binding upon 
everybody, including the UNSC.35  
 
                                                 
33 Article 15 TEU; Craig, de Búrca Paul Graínne, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials,4th 
ed., Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 84. 
34 Ibid. p. 17.  
35 See “Different Attitudes in Euroepan Courts to International Law” by Joanne Scott, June 
2006 from the International Economic Law and Policy Blog available at: 
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2006/04/index.html  
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I touched briefly upon the facts of the case earlier in the introduction. It is 
now time to go through the facts of the case in detail and the discussion that 
followed in the judgment.  
 
2.3.2 Facts of the Yusuf Case  
 
The Swedish citizens although originally from Somalia, Mr. Yusuf Ahmed 
Ali and two other individuals, Mr. Abdirisak Aden and Mr. Abdulaziz Abdi 
Ali, were suspected of connections with the terrorist network Al-Qaeda. 
They were together with the Barakaat International Foundation included in 
2001 on a list issued by the Sanctions Committee, established by the UNSC 
through the Resolution 1267 from 199936, with a mission to report to the 
UNSC with its observations and recommendations on the following tasks: 
 
(a) To seek from all States further information regarding the action taken 
by them with a view to effectively implementing the measures imposed by 
paragraph 4 above; 
 
(b) To consider information brought to its attention by States concerning 
violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above and to recommend 
appropriate measures in response thereto; 
 
(c) To make periodic reports to the Council on the impact, including the 
humanitarian implications, of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above; 
 
(d) To make periodic reports to the Council on information submitted to it 
regarding alleged violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 4 above, 
identifying where possible persons or entities reported to be engaged in such 
violations;37
 
The list of individuals and entities was subsequently amended by the 
Committee and the two other individuals were removed by the Sanctions 
Committee in 2002.38  
 
The EU Council adopted on the 14th of February 2000 Regulation No 
337/2000 on the basis of Articles 60 EC and 301 EC implementing the 
provisions of the Resolution by the UNSC39. These Regulations were also 
amended, following the advice by the Sanctions Committee and the UNSC 
Resolutions. Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 was adopted by the EU Council 
on March 6th 2001 defining the notion of “freezing of funds”.40 To this 
regulation was also supplemented the list, set up by the Sanctions 
Committee, containing the names of the individuals and entities subjected to 
                                                 
36 S/RES/1267 (1999), para., 6. 
 
37 Ibid. para., 6. 
38 Yusuf, para., 33. 
39 Ibid. para., 13. 
40 See Yusuf, para., 20 and Article 1 of Regulation No 467/2001.  
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the sanctions in what was called the Annex I.41 One year later the UNSC 
adopted a new resolution, 1452(2002), which included an exception to the 
obligation to freeze the funds of suspected terrorists. This exception 
amended Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 by Regulation (EC) No 561/2003.42
 
After the two other individuals, Mr. Ali and Mr. Aden, decided to 
discontinue their action only Mr. Yusuf and the Barakaat International 
Foundation (applicants) went on with their application against the 
Commission and the EU Council (defendants).43  
 
The applicants, Mr. Yusuf and the Barakkat International Foundation, set 
out three grounds of annulment, namely that the EU Council was 
incompetent to adopt the contested regulation (Regulation No 881/2002), 
infringement of Article 249 EC and a breach of their fundamental rights.44 
For this thesis, the first and last grounds of annulment are of most 
importance.  
 
Regarding the alleged breach of the applicants fundamental rights the 
applicants referred to both Article 6 (2) TEU and to the case-law of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ).45 The applicants further argued that their 
right to the use of their property and the right to a fair hearing, as guaranteed 
by Article 6 of the ECHR, had been violated. The regulation purported to 
have imposed heavy civil and criminal sanctions although the applicants had 
not first been heard or given the opportunity to defend themselves. The 
contested regulation had not either been subjected to any judicial review.46  
 
The reason for the applicants to end up on the list in the Annex I was never 
specified. Neither the council nor the Commission had examined the reasons 
for which the Sanctions Committee had included Mr Yusuf and Al Barakaat 
Foundation on the list. The applicants argue further that the source of 
information received by the Committee is obscure and the reasons why 
certain individuals have been included on the list without the opportunity to 
be heard are never mentioned.47  
 
The applicants also maintain that the duty to accept and carry out the 
decisions of the UNSC in Article 25 UN is not an absolute obligation. 
Neither is Article 103 UN binding except in public international law and 
does not mean that the members of the UN have no possibility to have 
regard to their own laws.48  
 
                                                 
41 Yusuf, para., 22. 
42 See paragraph 39 of the Case T-306/01, “the Yusuf Case” and Article 2a of Regulation 
No 561/2003. 
43 Yusuf, para., 68. 
44 Ibid, para 51 and 79. 
45 See inter alia Case 4/73 Nold v. Commission (1974) ECR 491 and Case 11/70 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) ECR 1125, Yusuf para., 190. 
46 Yusuf, para. 190. 
47 Ibid. para., 191.  
48 Ibid. para., 206. 
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The Commission and the Council considered on their behalf that the 
Community, like the members of the UN, was bound by international law to 
give effect to resolutions of the UNSC adopted under Chapter VII UN. They 
also considered that the powers of the Community institutions in this are 
was limited and that any other international agreement or rule of domestic 
law bound to hinder the implementation of the regulations must be 
disregarded. Since the UN is the chief responsible for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, all actions that the UNSC takes under 
Chapter VII UN must prevail over every other international obligation. A 
reference was made to Article 103 UN to come to the conclusion that the 
previously mentioned provision made it possible to disregard any other 
provision of international law, whether customary or laid down by 
convention, in order to apply the resolutions of the UNSC.49   
 
The Council and the Commission, in an attempt to make the argumentation 
waterproof, further argued that the uniformity and effectiveness of the 
application of the UNSC resolutions could not be maintained if a member of 
the UN could alter the contents of the UNSC resolutions.50  
 
The Commission also argued, based on Article 27 of the VCLT, that: 
 
If a provision of national law is inconsistent with an obligation under international law, it is 
for the State concerned to interpret that provision in the spirit of the Treaty or amend its 
national legislation so as to make it compatible with the obligation under international law.51
 
The Council and the Commission base much of their argumentation on the 
creation of an effect of legality deriving from the supremacy of the UN 
Charter. Since the Charter prevails over any other provision of international 
law, the actions taken in the name if the Charter naturally receives an effect 
of legality. The Council further claims that when the Community adopts 
regulations it reflects the desire of its member states to perform their 
obligations under the UN Charter. The nature of the Charter necessarily 
provides the Community the protection to carry out the actions and in 
particular the effect of legality.52   
 
On the point of the possible illegality of the adoption of the contested 
Regulation, the Council points at some key factors that allow the 
Community to adopt the contested regulation. Since the Community had 
decided to act by virtue of a Common Position 2002/402, it was not 
possible, without infringing its own international obligations, the 
international obligations of its member states and the duty of loyalty laid 
down in Article 10 EC, to exclude certain people from the list in Annex I. 
Neither was it possible to inform these individuals beforehand nor to bring 
proceedings making it possible to check whether the measures were 
justified.53
                                                 
49 Ibid., paras. 206 f. 
50 Ibid., para. 208. 
51 Ibid., para. 209. 
52 Ibid. paras., 207 and 212. 
53 Ibid. para., 215. 
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The Council claimed that it would be of no difference had the contested 
regulation been regarded as violating the applicant’s fundamental rights. 
The legal effect applies also with regard to fundamental rights, which may 
be temporarily suspended in time of an emergency as provided by 
international treaties. The Council also responded to the applicants request 
whether the regulation was compatible to the aim of the UN, especially 
regarding Article 1(3) UN, by referring to a theoretical scenario where the 
fundamental rights of the victims of terrorism would weigh up the 
fundamental rights of the victims of the sanctions.54     
 
Concerning the judicial review the defendants argued that the Court’s (CFI) 
jurisdiction must be limited or non existing in considering whether the 
adoption of the contested regulation consisted in a manifest error. A judicial 
review that would indirect review the measures decided upon by the UNSC  
would risk undermining one of the foundations of the world order 
established with the birth of the UN and would cause serious disruptions to 
the international relations of the Community and its member states.55 A 
judicial review of the legality of the contested regulation would also be open 
to challenge in the light of Article 10 EC and would conflict with the 
obligation on the Community to comply with international law. The 
defendants further claimed that such a review may not be challenged at 
national or Community level, but only directly before the UNSC, through 
the Government of the State of which the applicants are nationals.56   
 
Finally, the Council and the Commission argued, on the alleged breach of 
the applicants right to property, that the measures implementing contested 
regulation did not interfere with the applicants’ right to possess their 
property. According to the defendants, the right to possess property does not 
enjoy absolute protection and its exercise may be subjected to restrictions if 
justified by public interest objectives.  
 
 
2.3.3 Jugement of the CFI 
 
The CFI started out by clarifying that the original claim by the applicants 
was to seek the annulment of Regulation No 467/2001.57 Since that 
Regulation was amended by Regulation No 881/2002 the Council 
acknowledged that the applicants were entitled to adapt the original claims 
in their action so that those claims henceforth sought the annulment of 
Regulation No 881/2002.58   
                                                 
54 Ibid. para. 216 f. 
55 E.g. how the Sanctions Committee places individuals on the lists contained in the UNSC 
resolutions and the regulations of the EC. 
56 Yusuf, para., 219. 
57 Ibid, para 42.  
58 Ibid. para 51f.  
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The two regulations were adopted on partly different legal grounds. The 
adoption of regulation 467/2001 was based on Articles 60 EC and 301 EC 
while the contested regulation was adopted based on Articles 60 EC 301 EC 
and 308 EC. The two regulations were also directed at different targets 
where Regulation No 467/2001 was specifically aimed at targeting a third 
country, Afghanistan, while Regulation No 881/2002 targets more generally 
Usama bin Laden, members of the Al.Qaeda and the Taliban and other 
individuals and entities associated with them.59 However, the Court decided 
to set out the grounds on which it considered the applicants grounds to be 
unfounded concerning Regulation No 467/2001 in their original claim, since 
those grounds also constituted one of the premises of its reasoning when 
examining the legal basis of the contested regulation.60     
 
The CFI considered that the Council was competent to adopt Regulation No 
467/2001 even when the affected individuals and entities were nationals of a 
MS. The applicants claimed that the Council was incompetent to adopt such 
a regulation since there was nothing in the wording of Articles 60 EC and 
301 EC that could justify a sanction imposed on nationals of the EU. The 
sanctions would also be contrary to the free movement of capital since they 
affected nationals of a MS.61The Court pointed to the necessity of efficient 
application of the Articles 60 EC and 301 EC and stated that 
 
As the Commission has rightly pointed out, Articles 60 EC and 301 EC would not provide an 
efficient means of applying pressure to the rulers with influence over the policy of a third 
country if the Community could not, on the basis of those provisions, adopt measures against 
individuals who, although not resident in the third country in question, are sufficiently 
connected to the regime against which the sanctions are directed.62  
 
The Court subsequently continued by stating that  
 
the fact that some of those individuals so targeted happen to be nationals of a Member State is 
irrelevant, for, if they are to be effective in the context of the free movement of capital, financial 
sanctions cannot be confined solely to nationals of the third country concerned.63
 
The Court considered that interpretation to be justified both by effective and 
humanitarian concerns. The applicants were also considered to come under 
the scope of the regulation since there was a connection between Usama bin 
Laden, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Afghanistan all of which form a 
legitimate ground for interrupting or reducing economic relations. Finally, 
the Court also found the measures provided by the regulation to be 
proportionate since the sanctions may not go beyond what is appropriate and 
                                                 
59 See Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002, 29.5.2002 Official Journal of 
the European Communities L 139/9; Summary of the judgement in case T-306/01, “the 
Yusuf Case”, para 1ff 
60 Case T-306/01 ” the Yusuf Case” para., 107. 
61 Ibid. para 110 ff.  
62 Yusuf, para., 115. 
63 Yusuf, para., 115. 
 20
necessary to the attainment of the objective pursued by the Community 
legislation imposing them.64   
 
At the time of the adoption of the contested regulation (Regulation No 
881/2002) the international situation had changed and the US and its allies 
had intervened in Afghanistan and overthrown the Taliban regime.65 In the 
absence of a direct connection to the Afghan territory, the Council and the 
Commission considered that Articles 60 EC and 301 EC did not constitute a 
sufficient legal base for the adoption of Regulation No 881/2002. Both the 
previously mentioned articles refer specifically to third countries and since 
the governing regime of the third country in question had disappeared there 
ceased to be a sufficient link between those individuals and entities and a 
third country. Therefore, the contested regulation could not be based 
solemnly on Articles 60 EC and 301 EC but had to be combined with 
Article 308 EC.66  
 
The latter article provides a mechanism for the Council to act on a proposal 
from the Commission to attain one of the objectives of the Community even 
where there exists no provision conferring the necessary power to do so67. 
The CFI argued that since there is nothing in the EC Treaty that provided 
for the adoption of the measures laid down in the contested regulation the 
conditions for the applicability for Article 308 EC have to be fulfilled. 
However, neither Article 60 EC, 301 EC nor 308 EC constitute of itself a 
sufficient legal basis for the contested regulation. The articles must therefore 
be considered all together for the articles to create a sufficient legal base for 
the adoption of Regulation No 881/2002.68 The CFI continued its 
argumentation by pointing to the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) under which the Council can adopt a common position or a joint 
action.69 Economic and financial sanctions on individuals could, when 
considering all of the above stated legal grounds, be imposed without any 
connection whatsoever with the territory or governing regime of a third 
country.70 Finally, the Court proclaimed that  
 
Against that background, recourse to Article 308 EC, in order to supplement the powers to 
impose economic and financial sanctions conferred on the Community by Articles 60 EC and 
301 EC, is justified by the consideration that, as the world now stands, States can no longer be 
regarded as the only source of threats to international peace and security.71       
 
                                                 
64 Ibid. para., 116 ff. 
65 The armed intervention of Afghanistan under the consent of the UNSC by the US and its 
allies was launched in October 2001. By the time the UNSC Resolution 1390 (2002) was 
adopted on January 6th 2002, the allied forces had already overthrown the Taliban regime.  
66 Ibid. Para., 130 ff. 
67 Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Commuity, Part XI 
General and Final Provisions, Article 308; Yusuf  para., 135. 
68 Yusuf, para., 157 f. 
69 See inter alia Articles 11, 12 and 13 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on 
European Union.  
70 Yusuf, para., 158. 
71 Ibid. para., 169. 
 21
The final grounds of annulment are of most importance for this paper. The 
breach of fundamental rights was divided up into three parts, a breach of the 
applicants’ right to a fair hearing, breach of the right to property and a lack 
of legal review.72
 
The CFI started out by stating that it could rule on the plea alleged breach of 
the applicants’ fundamental rights only in so far as it falls within the scope 
of its judicial review and as it is capable of leading to annulment of the 
contested regulation. Subsequently the CFI considered the relationship 
between the legal order under the UN Charter and the domestic or 
Community legal order. The Court found the UN Charter to clearly prevail 
over any other obligation of domestic law or international treaty and that 
Article 103 UN implies that the Charter prevailed also in respect of treaties 
made earlier than the Charter. According to the rule of primacy in Article 27 
of the VCLT a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty. 73 The primacy of the Charter 
also extends to decisions contained in a resolution of the UNSC according 
to Article 25 UN under which all members of the UN agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the UNSC.74   
 
To finalize the issue of primacy the CFI drew attention to the relationship 
between the Member States of the EU and its obligations towards EC law 
and its obligations under the UN Charter. According to the Court, all 
member states of the EU were already parties to the UN prior to their 
accession to the EC or the EU.75 The Court further argued that, according to 
settled case law of the ECJ and Article 307 EC, application of the EC Treaty 
does not affect the duty to respect the rights of a Third country and to 
perform its obligations there under. The rule of primacy was further 
specifically introduced into the EC Treaty through Article 297 EC. The 
provision urges the member states to consult each other in order to carry out 
obligations it has accepted for the purposes of maintaining international 
peace and security.76  
 
The Court concluded that, pursuant to both the rules of general international 
law and to the previously mentioned provisions of the EC Treaty, member 
states must leave unapplied any provision of Community law that raises any 
impediment to the proper performance of their obligations under the UN 
Charter.77  
 
                                                 
72 Supra n. 190. 
73 The rule of primacy is derived from the principles of customary international law, 
codified in Article 27 VCLT. 
74 Yusuf, paras., 232 ff. 
75 Five of the six signatories to the EC Treaty were already members of the UN and 
although the Federal Republic of Germany was not formally admitted as a member of the 
UN until 1973, it still had a duty to perform its obligations under the UN Charter according 
to agreements signed prior to the signing of the EC Treaty.    
76 Yusuf, para., 235 ff. 
77 Eeckhout, p. 185. 
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The CFI subsequently admitted that the Charter as a matter of international 
law does not directly bind the Community since it is not a member of the 
UN. However, the Court found that the Community is bound, in the same 
way as its member states, by virtue of the EC Treaty, as a matter of 
Community law. The consequence of this is that the Community may not 
infringe the obligations imposed on its member states by the Charter or 
impede their performance and that in the exercise of its powers it is bound 
to adopt all the measures necessary to enable its member states to fulfil 
those obligations.78     
 
Concerning the lack of judicial review, or rather the legal possibility for the 
CFI to perform judicial review the CFI considered that it resulted from the 
proceedings that there were structural limits on its judicial-review capacity. 
The applicants had sought for the annulment of the contested regulation and 
the Court considered that: 
 
Any review of the internal lawfulness of the contested regulation, especially having regard to 
the provisions or general principles of Community law relating to the protection of fundamental 
rights, would therefore imply that the Court is to consider, indirectly, the lawfulness of those 
resolutions. In that hypothetical situation, in fact, the origin of the illegality alleged by the 
applicant would have to be sought, not in the adoption of the contested regulation but in the 
resolutions of the Security Council which imposed the sanctions (…). 
In particular, if the Court were to annul the contested regulation, as the applicants claim it 
should, although that regulation seems to be imposed by international law, on the ground that 
that act infringes their fundamental rights which are protected by the Community legal order, 
such annulment would indirectly mean that the resolutions of the Security Council concerned 
themselves infringe those fundamental rights. In other words, the applicants ask the Court to 
declare by implication that the provision of international law at issue infringes the fundamental 
rights of individuals, as protected by the Community legal order. 79  
 
The CFI was not willing to review the legality of the regulation since it did 
not consider it to have jurisdiction solely on the grounds of general 
principles of Community law. Neither could the CFI indirectly review the 
laglity of the resolutions of the UNSC in the light of Community law since 
the Community is bound to interpret and apply Community law in a manner 
compatible with the obligations of the member states under the UN 
Charter.80  
 
The CFI did not stop there, since it probably realized that if they did it 
would seem like there was no remedy whatsoever.81 So in the end the Court 
found that it could none the less check, indirectly, the lawfulness of the 
resolutions of the UNSC in question. After all, the EC regulations were 
based on the UNSC resolutions.82 The Court found a ground for jurisdiction 
with the motivation that jus cogens, as a set of rules of public international 
law binding on all subjects of international law, allows for now derogation. 
                                                 
78 Ibid. p. 186. 
79 Yusuf, paras., 267 f.  
80 Supra n. 62 and Yusuf, para., 276.  
81 See Eeckhout, p. 186. 
82 See supra n. 23 and 26. 
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Therefore, if the UNSC resolutions failed to respect jus cogens, they would 
bind neither the members of the UN, nor the Community.83   
 
After the ascertainment of the ground for judicial review, the Court moved 
forward to review the alleged breach of the applicants’ right to a fair hearing 
and a right to property.   
 
The CFI carried out a careful examination of the different arguments. The 
Court made no distinction between the individual Mr Yusuf and the entity 
Al Barakaat but rather reviewed their rights in the light of jus cogens. I will 
not go through all the different arguments that the Court examined. 
However, and most importantly, the Court referred to the principle of 
proportionality to judge whether the regulation breached their fundamental 
rights. 
 
Since the contested regulation, amended by Regulation No 561/2003, 
adopted Resolution 1452 (2002), which allowed for the national authorities 
to declare the freezing of funds to be inapplicable to the funds necessary to 
cover basic expenses for foodstuffs, rent etc, it was not considered 
disproportionate to the purpose. 84 The freezing of the funds did further not 
affect the very substance of the property but only the use thereof. Thus, 
there was no breach of the right to property according to the rules of jus 
cogens85.    
 
Concerning the right to a fair hearing the CFI considered that the right for 
the individuals on the list, to address a request to the Sanctions Committee 
through the national authorities, amounted in a possibility to oppose the 
decision. The Swedish Government had in fact heard the applicants and as a 
result, two of the original applicants were subsequently excluded from the 
list.86  
 
The Court acknowledged the right to make view on the evidence upon 
which the sanction is imposed as a fundamental principle of Community 
law. However, this fundamental principle was developed through case law 
in areas such as competition law, anti-dumping action and State aid. 
According to case law the right of the person concerned to make his point of 
view known is correlated to the exercise of discretion by the authority which 
is the issuer of the act, i.e. the UNSC. The Community could therefore not 
review the applicant’s right to a fair hearing based on general principles of 
Community law and was further not obliged to hear the applicants before 
the contested regulation was adopted.87     
 
                                                 
83 Eeckhout, p. 187, Yusuf, para., 276 f. 
84 See supra n. 26. 
85 Yusuf, 290 ff. 
86 Ibid. paras., 33 and 318.  
87 Ibid. paras., 325 – 329.  
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The denial of judicial review by the CFI has been criticised widely.88 The 
fact that the Court did not consider itself to be able to challenge the 
contested regulation according to the general principles of Community law 
left it with a review solely on the grounds of jus cogens, which does not 
offer the same standard of review as Community law.    
 
On the 21 November 2005, Mr Yusuf and Al Barakaat appealed the 
judgment of the CFI before the ECJ. While the case was still pending, the 
Sanctions Committee decided to remove Mr Yusuf from the list why he 
decided to discontinue his action. In the case C-415/05, which is still 
pending before the ECJ, only Al Barakaat has pursued the appeal.89   
 
 
2.4 Case-law of the CFI; the Kadi, Ayadi 
and Organisation des Modjahedines du 
peuple d’Iran cases  
 
2.4.1 Introductory remarks 
The CFI has been faced with several cases such as the Yusuf case, 
contesting decisions by the Community that in one way or the other have 
breached the applicants fundamental rights. The Yassin Abdullah Kadi v 
Council and Commission (Kadi) case was joined together with the Yusuf 
case since the both the cases sought the annulment of Regulation No 
881/2002. Mr. Kadi also claimed his fundamental rights to be breached due 
to the sanctions imposed on him. As in the Yusuf case the CFI came to the 
conclusion that it could neither review the contested regulation nor was 
there a breach of the applicants fundamental rights in the light of jus 
cogens.90 I will therefore not go through the Kadi case further but instead 
move forward to the other cases mentioned in the title of this chapter since 
the judgments in those cases differ from the ones in Kadi and Yusuf. 
 
                                                 
88 See inter alia Eeckhout, p. 187. 
89 Opinion of the Advocate General Poires Maduro in Case C-415/05 P, Al Barakaat 
International Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, para. 9.   
90 See Chapter 2.2.2 Facts of the Yusuf case and Summary of the case T-315/01 Yassin 
Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commission (2005) ECR II-3639 (Kadi), paras., 6-8.  
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2.4.2 The Ayadi case 
The CFI confirmed much of the reasoning from the Yusuf and Kadi cases in 
the Ayadi v Council and Commission (Ayadi) case from 2006.91 The 
difference was that the CFI went further in providing for a certain level of 
the protection for fundamental rights. The case also concerned the freezing 
of funds and the applicant sought the annulment of Regulation No 467/2001 
and plead for a breach of his fundamental rights. Mr. Ayadi’s name was 
included on a list in Regulation No 467/2001 and later 881/2002 and was 
subjected to a freezing of his funds according to the regulations and the 
resolutions from the UNSC as in the previous cases.92   
 
Mr. Ayadi argued that the exemptions from the freezing of the funds to 
cover basic expenses were ineffective since he found it difficult to carry on 
a business. The CFI was willing to recognize that the freezing of funds was 
a particularly drastic measure which was capable of obstructing the 
individual from leading a normal social life and of making the individual 
wholly dependent on public assistance. However, the Court found the aims 
pursued by the contested regulation outweighed the effects of the sanctions 
on the individual. The CFI held that the regulation did not prevent Mr. 
Ayadi from leading a satisfactory personal, family and social life since he 
could still earn money and carry on a business.93    
 
The Court continued its argumentation by stressing the possible diplomatic 
remedies available for individuals listed in the UNSC resolutions. Any 
individual can petition their government to intervene on their behalf at UN 
level. The Court shift some of the burden of compliance with fundamental 
rights when is stresses that the member states of the EU have an obligation 
to act on behalf of its nationals to request them to be removed from the list. 
These obligations were said to stem from the member states duty to respect 
fundamental rights as general principles of Community law. To sum up the 
Court once again considered the Community to be able to adopt regulations 
imposing economic sanctions on individuals based on the provisions of the 
EC Treaty.94       
 
2.4.3 The Organisation des Modjahedines du 
peuple d’Iran Case  
 
The first case from the CFI where the Court annulled a Community measure 
concerning the freezing of funds was the Organisation des Modjahedines du 
                                                 
91 In the doctrine it is also frequently mentioned another case, the Hassan v Council and 
Commission case, which is almost identical to the Ayadi case in its reasoning why I chose 
not to mention that case. 
92 T-253/02 Chafiq Ayadi v Council and Commission (2006) ECR ECR II-2139 (Ayadi) 
paras., inter alia 29 and 38. 
93 Eeckhout, p. 187. 
94 Ibid. p. 188. 
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people d’Iran (OMPI) case from 2006.95 The case is significant since it 
offers a noteworthy contrast to the Yusuf and Kadi cases.  
 
In short, the case concerned the listing of an organization, not by the UNSC 
but by the EU itself.96 The CFI annulled the Community act which was a 
Council decision implementing an EC Regulation since it violated the right 
to a fair hearing, the right to an effective judicial remedy, and the obligation 
to state reasons.97  
 
The court held that:  
 
the right to a fair hearing applies in all proceedings against a person which are liable to 
culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person, and that the freezing of funds constitutes 
such a measure.98  
     
The consequence of this is that the individuals concerned must be informed 
of the evidence, and must be granted the possibility to make known his view 
on that evidence. To safeguard the surprise effect of the sanctions the 
notification of the evidence and a hearing of the individuals may be carried 
out subsequent to the adoption of the regulations. Some restrictions may 
also be considered when adopting the regulations. Evidence must be notified 
along with or as soon as possible after the adoption of the initial decision 
and individuals must have the possibility to request an immediate re-
examination. Overriding security or international relations considerations 
may also preclude the communication to the parties concerned of certain 
evidence against them.99  
 
The Court further stressed the importance of the obligation to state reasons. 
This is especially important when the party concerned was not afforded the 
opportunity to be heard prior to the decision to freeze the funds. However, 
as in the example of the presentation of the evidence stated above, the 
overriding security or international relations considerations may again 
restrict the obligation to state reasons.100  
 
On the issue of judicial review the CFI held that the review was 
tremendously vital since it constituted the only procedural safeguard 
ensuring that a fair balance was struck between the need to combat 
international terrorism and the protection of fundamental rights.101    
 
The Court went on its argumentation by stating that: 
 
Since the restrictions imposed by the Council on the right of the parties concerned to a fair 
hearing must be offset by a strict judicial review which is independent and impartial (…), the 
                                                 
95 T-228/02 Organisation des Modjahedines du people d’Iran (2006) (OMPI) ECR II-4665 
96 OMPI. Para., 14. 
97 Eeckhout, p. 188. 
98 Supra n. 80. 
99 Eeckhout, p. 188 f. 
100 Ibid. p., 189. 
101 OMPI, para., 155. 
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Community Courts must be able to review the lawfulness and merits of the measures to freeze 
funds without it being possible to raise objections that the evidence and information used by the 
Council is secret or confidential. 102
 
The CFI applied the above stated principles to the judgement in the OMPI 
case, thus leading it to the annulment of the contested Decision.103 
Nevertheless, the Court pointed out that, in fact even after the oral 
procedures had ended, it was not in a position to review the lawfulness of 
the decision, since it had no evidence or information about the reasons for 
OMPI’s listing, or even about which national decision the listing was based 
on. As a result, not only did the Decision, leading to the contested 
regulation, breach the applicant’s fundamental rights, but it also did not 
provide satisfactory background information, thus preventing the Court to 
carry out a judicial review.104   
 
Once again it seems like the Community courts found a way to circumvent a 
proper judicial review; but what would happen if the Courts could extent 
their jurisdiction to the intergovernmental dimension, i.e. the EU?  
 
 
2.5 The review of legality and the impact 
of the ECJ in the intergovernmental 
dimension   
 
2.5.1 Introductory remarks 
The most important provisions for the review of legality, or judicial review,  
are Article 230, 288 and 234 EC. Articles 230 and 288 EC are provisions 
under which individuals have the locus standi to seek judicial review, while 
Article 234 EC offers an indirect judicial review through the preliminary 
ruling system. I will not go deeper into these basic provisions of judicial 
review but instead focus on recent CFI and ECJ case law and how the ECJ 
has chosen to consider itself qualified to perform judicial review of acts 
which normally would be exempted from a review of legality.   
 
                                                 
102 Ibid. para., 155. 
103 Council Decision 2005/930/EC of 21 December 2005 implementing Article 2(3) of 
Regulation No 2580/2001 and repealing Decision 2005/848/EC, OMPI, para., 17.  
104 OMPI, paras., 165 f.; Eeckhout p. 189 f.  
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2.5.2 Judicial review in the intergovernmental 
dimension: OMPI, Segi and the impact of the 
ECJ 
In OMPI there was another aspect, apart from the review of EC measures, of 
the review of legality that is of great interest for this paper. In OMPI the 
applicant had not only urged the CFI to review the legality of the EC 
measure but also the legality of the Common Position. Thus, demanding the 
Court to extend its jurisdiction to cover not only the EC dimension but also 
the intergovernmental dimension.105  
 
The Union courts are not competent to review Common Positions: neither 
directly, through an action for annulment, nor indirectly by giving 
preliminary rulings to a national court. Therefore, the CFI refused to review 
the legality of the Common Position in OMPI.106  
 
The same conclusion had been reached in the case, Segi v Council (Segi) 
from 2004. The circumstances were identical to the OMPI case and it 
seemed like the review of Common Positions were to be kept out of the 
jurisdiction of the Union courts.107 However, the Segi case was appealed 
before the ECJ who, contrary to the CFI, considered it to be able to review 
the Common Position.108 Hence, the ECJ extended the judicial control in the 
intergovernmental pillars of the EU; from the EC pillar to the second 
pillar.109    
 
The ECJ found its way to review the common position in the TEU. The 
Court argued that the TEU never was meant to give the legal base for the 
review of Common Positions since these measures were not supposed to 
produce legal effects in relation to third parties. According to Article 35 of 
the TEU, review of legality is granted to all measures that do produce such 
effects. Since the Common Position was intended to produce such effects, 
the Common Position was consequently open for review by the Union 
courts. As a result of the nature of the TEU, the treaty only allows for 
indirect review through preliminary rulings in national courts before the 
ECJ or directly before the ECJ by a Member State or the Commission. 
Individuals are not allowed to challenge the validity of the Common 
Positions. The applicants were unsuccessful in their appeal to challenge the 
Common Position directly for the latter reasons.110      
 
                                                 
105 OMPI, paras., 17 f. 
106 Hinarejos Alicia, Recent Human Rights Developments in the EU Courts: The Charter of 
fundamental Rights, the European Arrest Warrant and Terror Lists, Human Rights Law 
Review, 2003, p. 17; T-338/02 Segi v Council (2004) ECR II-1647 (CFI Segi).   
107 The circumstances were identical, except that there was no EC Regulation implementing 
a common position: just a common position containing a list of terrorist organizations, 
Hinarejos, p. 17. 
108 C-355/04 P Segi v Council (2007) (ECJ Segi) 
109 Hinarejos, p. 18. 
110 Ibid. p. 18. 
 29
The lack of possibilities for individuals to claim direct review of the 
decisions affecting them in the Common Positions puts all hope for those 
affected to indirect review. This may not be ideal from a legal certainty 
perspective since it puts much faith in the national implementation of the 
decisions in order to have access to a national court. The individual has 
further on no right to a reference to the ECJ and no influence on how the 
question for the preliminary ruling is framed. The preliminary reference 
procedure is also not available with the same features in all Member 
States.111  
 
In the end of its judgment the Court stressed the importance for every 
Member State to make it as easy as possible to have access to indirect 
action: 
 
Finally, it is to be borne in mind that it is for the Member States and, in particular, their 
courts and tribunals, to interpret and apply national procedural rules governing the exercise of 
rights of action in a way that enables natural and legal persons to challenge before the courts 
the lawfulness of any decision or other national measure relating to the drawing up of an act of 
the European Union or to its application to them and to seek compensation for any loss suffered. 
112     
 
Even if the individuals failed to contest the Common Position the ECJ 
opened up for a vital extended jurisdiction over the judicial control in the 
intergovernmental pillars.113 In the ongoing war on terror a multitude of 
anti-terror measures are being adopted in these areas, affecting the rights of 
many individuals. The problem demonstrates the insufficiency of the TEU 
when it comes to judicial control in the intergovernmental dimension. By its 
judgment, the ECJ shows that it is aware of this and that it is willing to push 
the boundaries to some extent.114  
                                                 
111 Ibid. p. 18. 
112 Segi, para., 56. 
113 Ibid. Para., 57. 
114 Hinarejos, p. 18 f.  
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3 International law 
3.1 Targeted Sanctions of the UN 
3.1.1 Introductory Remarks 
The UNSC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security according to Article 24(1) of the UN 
Charter. When the UNSC considers a situation to be a threat, or a breach, of 
the peace, the UNSC acting under Article 39 UN and 40 UN, can order its 
members to undertake provisional measures. These measures may be non-
forcible, e.g. sanctions, under Article 41 UN or military under Article 42 
UN. By stating that the UNSC is “acting under Chapter VII” the UNSC is 
not obliged to specify under which provision of the UN Charter it has based 
its resolution.115  
 
The definition of a targeted sanction is not generally accepted but the notion 
typically includes e.g. the freezing of financial assets; the suspension of 
credits and aid; flight bans and the denial of international travel, visas and 
educational opportunities.116   
 
Not all sanctions involve targeting individuals. However, when this is the 
case, as with the sanctions concerning Afghanistan/Al-Qaeda, it is primarily 
done by means of a “blacklist”. The UNSC adopts a resolution and 
delegates to a sanctions committee, consisting of all the members of the 
UNSC, the task of drawing up a list of blacklisted persons.117  
 
3.1.2 The background to the Discussion on 
Targeted Sanctions 
 
The practice of targeted sanctions began with the UNITA sanctions in 1997 
and 1998.118 Following these sanctions the UNSC issued a number of 
resolutions imposing sanctions. The focus of all of these sanctions was 
government/rebel leaders who could easily be identified and the discussion 
                                                 
115 Cameron Iain, UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention 
on Human Rights, Nordic Journal of International Law, 2003, p. 159 f. 
116 Ibid. p. 160. 
117 Ibid. p 160. 
118 Resolution 1127 (1997) imposed travel bans on UNITA leaders and their immediate 
family members. Resolutions 1173 and 1176 (1998) imposed financial sanctions on UNITA 
members. The UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) was a 
guerrilla in the civil war of Angola; Cameron, p 163; www.un.org
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concerned mainly how to identify reliably the scope of the government/rebel 
circle.119
 
When the Al-Qaeda and Taliban regime started to become more active in 
global terrorism the UNSC brought in sanctions by means of Resolution 
1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000).120 These sanctions were directed at the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan and were targeted at the financing of the 
regime. The main reasons for this were the Taliban regime’s encouragement 
of opium growing and its refusal to extradite Usama bin Laden to the US.121  
 
3.1.3 UN Sanctions at the Present State 
 
There are many different international sanctions directed against terrorism. 
The regimes for the resolutions implementing certain economic sanctions 
also differ somewhat. The economic sanctions against individuals and 
entities stems, inter alia, from UNSC Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000) 
and 1390 (2002), all concerning the freezing of funds of those individuals 
and organizations suspected of having connections with the Taliban regime, 
Al-Qaeda and Usama bin Laden. These organizations and individuals are 
identified on a list which is continuously updated by the Sanctions 
Committee under the UNSC. There is also the UNSC Resolution 1373 
(2001) imposing the obligation on all members of the UN to freeze the 
funds of those individuals connected with terrorist activities in general. This 
resolution contains no blacklist of individuals. An obligation to freeze the 
funds is also found in Article 8 of the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorism.122   
 
A majority of the members of the UN, including all the member states if the 
EU, have decided to administer a legal framework which simply copies the 
lists from the UNSC Resolutions. The listing is a very effective tool since it 
gives effect immediately as the decision is taken by the UNSC to freeze the 
funds. Under Article 25 and 48 of the UN Charter, all UN members are 
obliged to implement these measures. As previously mentioned, Article 103 
UN also secures the full implementation of the sanctions since they precede 
all other international treaty obligations.123  
 
Since the listing of individuals and entities associated with al-Qaeda, as 
Resolution 1267 (1999) puts it, many names of individuals and entities have 
passed through the lists. At present, there are 142 individuals associated 
                                                 
119 Cameron, p. 163. 
120 Usama bin Laden was (and is still) suspected of having been behind the bombing of the 
US embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salem; Cameron, p. 163.  
121 Cameron, p. 163. 
122 Kruse Anders, Financial and Economic Sanctions – From a Perspective of International 
Law and Human Rights, Journal of Financial Crime, 2005, p. 217; Cameron, p. 164. 
123 Ibid, p. 218. 
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with the Taliban, 230 individuals associated with Al-Qaeda and 112 entities 
and organizations associated with al-Qaeda on the list.124
 
 
3.1.4 The Drawing up of a Blacklist Proceedings 
 
The drawing up of a blacklist involves primarily identifying the targets. This 
procedure is easy when the targets are governmental officials. When the 
circle expands it becomes more difficult as the targets could be anyone with 
a connection to terrorism, e.g. businesspersons involved in supporting the 
targeted government.125  
 
The UN Secretariat, which assists the sanctions committee in the 
blacklisting of individuals, lacks both capacity and expertise in identifying 
persons supporting, or are influential in relation to, a targeted government. 
The sanctions committee therefore receives information elsewhere, 
primarily from those member states that have both an interest in the matter 
and sufficient diplomatic and intelligence gathering capacity. Other sources 
of information can be expert panels established by sanctions committees to 
monitor the implementation of sanctions and finally public sources.126    
It is also no always clear which states have proposed which individuals. The 
typical situation is that the state that has economic and/or historical interests 
in the targeted state takes the lead in the blacklisting. The main source of the 
names on the Afghanistan/Al-Qaeda lists appears to have been the US.127
 
According to the practice of US blacklisting the formal basis is often a 
public source, company registers or newspaper reports. Other, perhaps more 
liable sources of information can be secret intelligence material or 
confidential material such as embassy reports. This information is often 
used as a primary source of information and a suggestion for further 
investigation. The confidential nature of the material from secret 
intelligence and embassy reports makes it almost impossible for anyone to 
take part of the information forming the basis for the listing.128    
                                                 
124 Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999) concerning 
Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities, Consolidated list 
pursuant to the latest update on April 21st 2008, available at 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml (www.un.org)   
125 Cameron, p. 165.  
126 Ibid, p 165.  
127 Ibid, p. 165. 
128 Occasionally, information might be given on a bilateral basis where the designating state 
trusts the requesting state to maintain the confidentiality of the information. 
 Cameron, p. 165 f.  
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 3.1.5 The Problem of the Evidence for the 
Blacklisting 
 
When states submit names of individuals the sanctions committees are more 
or less in a position to having to trust the states in submitting the names.129 
There are no obvious criteria to measure the evidence against these 
individuals since the supposed activity, involving a threat to international 
peace and security is never defined. Consequently, the sanctions committee 
have never, or rarely, evaluated the evidence against the individuals.130  
 
The problem of not evaluating the evidence against the individuals becomes 
flagrant when considering the rapid procedure of the adoption of the 
sanctions.131 The speed of the process is necessary to retain the element of 
surprise, but it leaves very little or no time to check if they have any 
intelligence on the individuals concerned. The often large number of 
individuals proposed at the same time, makes it hard, even for states with 
major intelligence, to check the proposed list. Moreover, once a name is on 
the list any member of the UNSC can block its removal since the procedure 
de facto is a decision of the UNSC. The approval of a blacklist provides no, 
or little, means for any member of the UN to challenge the decision at 
national level.132     
 
This still leaves us with no clear answer to the question whether there are 
any means of redress to secure the legal certainty for the individuals ending 
up on the blacklists?  
 
 
3.1.6 Resolution 1730 (2006) – A Guarantee for 
a Fair and Clear Procedure? 
 
Resolution 1730 was adopted on the 19th of December in 2006 by the 
UNSC. The Resolution focuses on a de-listing possibility for individuals 
and entities on sanctions lists. The UNSC emphasizes that the implemented 
resolution is a part of its commitment to ensure that fair and clear 
                                                 
129 Three major sanctions committees are established under the UNSC in connection with 
the fight against terrorism: the 1267 Committee, the “CTC” (Counter-Terrorism 
Committee) and the 1540 Committee. Available at 
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/index.shtml  
130 Cameron, p. 166.  
131 The sanctions against individuals are notified to the UNSC members and, occasionally, 
to the state of nationality, 48 hours before the sanctions are adopted. Cameron, p. 166.  
132 Cameron, p. 166. 
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procedures exist for placing individuals and entities on sanctions lists and 
for removing them, as well as for granting humanitarian exemptions.133  
 
The UNSC also requested the Secretary-General to establish within the 
Secretariat (Security Council Subsidiary Organs Branch), a focal point to 
receive de-listing requests and perform the tasks described in the annex to 
Resolution 1730. Petitioners can submit their requests through their state 
residence or citizenship. A state can also decide that its nationals or 
residents should address their de-listing requests directly to the focal 
point.134
 
The government of the designating state or the focal points subsequently 
refers the petition to the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee who will 
place the de-listing request on the Committee’s agenda. Any member of the 
Sanctions Committee may however recommend a de-listing after the 
consultation with the designating government, even if the designated 
government reviewed the de-listing to be justified. If no Committee member 
recommends a de-listing after a certain period of time (up to four months) 
the petition shall be deemed rejected. The focal point subsequently has to 
inform the petitioner of its decision135.  
 
It is hard to imagine this procedure as a guarantee for a fair and clear 
procedure at this point. The possibility for individuals and entities to 
petition for a de-listing, in other words opposing a UNSC decision, directly 
(or through the state of citizenship or residence) is a step closer to securing 
legal certainty. However, the de-listing procedure provided for in Resolution 
1730 grants the petitioner neither a right to give his view on the evidence 
against him, nor a possibility to explain or defend himself. This is obvious 
considering the fact that the procedure is not a proper hearing, but only a 
petition proceeding. The procedure does not provide the satisfactory degree 
of judicial review since it still grants much of the power to the Sanctions 
Committee and leaves little, or no, option for the individuals to influence the 
decision. The petitioner is forced to rely on the accuracy of the Committee 
work and that the decision not to de-list was based on proper intelligence or 
clear evidence.  
 
 
 
                                                 
133 Focal Point for De-listing established pursuant to Security Council  
resolution 1730 (2006), available at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/dfp.shtml; See also 
the Preamble to S/RES/1730 (2006).  
134 Focal Point for De-listing established pursuant to Security Council  
resolution 1730 (2006), available at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/dfp.shtml; See also 
the De-listing procedure in S/RES/1730 (2006).  
 
135 S/RES/1730 (2006), Articles 6-7.  
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 3.2 The binding nature of the UN Charter  
 
3.2.1 Introductory remarks 
 
The binding nature of the UN Charter was confirmed by the CFI in the 
Yusuf case. As previously mentioned, the Court took the view that the 
Community was unable to review an EC Regulation since it did not possess 
the power to perform such a review. The question is nevertheless if respect 
for international law commands the CFI to declare that a listing in an EC 
Regulation cannot be reviewed in the light of general principles of 
Community law?136
 
3.2.2 Two dimensions to the binding nature of 
the UN Charter 
 
In international law the binding nature of the UN Charter is embodied in 
Article 103 UN. It acts for the member states of the EU in the sense that in 
case of conflict between their obligations under the EC Treaty and those 
under the UN Charter, the latter prevails. This is fully accepted and also 
confirmed by Articles 297 and 307 EC. Hence, to state that the Charter is 
binding is not equivalent to excluding judicial review of a regulation based 
on primary EC law.137    
 
Presume the CFI would review and annul an EC Regulation, implementing 
a UNSC Resolution. The legal basis for the Community for freezing the 
assets of the various applicants would have disappeared, as the Regulation 
would have been null and void under EC law. However, the freezing 
measures operate at national level wherefore the member states would no 
longer be bound by the EC Regulation but continue to be bound by its UN 
obligations. As sovereign states they have the required legal means for 
continuing to apply those measures. Therefore, the annulment could by no 
means suggest that the member states are prohibited from freezing the funds 
of the individuals on the blacklists.138  
 
The second dimension of the binding nature of the UN Charter is that the 
binding nature in fact governs the acts of the Community institutions, not of 
the member states. It narrows those institutions’ powers. The EC Treaty 
demands respect for fundamental rights, but this demand is overridden by 
                                                 
136 Eeckhout, p 190. See supra n. 63. 
137 Ibid. p. 191. 
138 Ibid. p. 192. 
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the need to comply with the obligations under the UN Charter. As a result, 
member states could not even be confronted with the conflicts. The 
institutions of the EU need to ensure that they respect UN Resolutions even 
if it implies violating general principles of Community law. The Courts are 
equally not able to review any such violations, which are imposed by a UN 
Resolution.139  
 
So, if the binding nature of the UN Charter narrows the powers of the EU 
institutions, is there any way to narrow the powers of the UN organs? The 
following chapters will examine the issue further.  
 
3.3 The Legitimacy of the Actions Under 
the UN Charter 
 
3.3.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
It was to keep the peace and not to change the world order that the Security 
Council was set up140
 
 
3.3.2 The Security Council as a World Law-
maker 
 
The UN Charter offers a wide measure of discretion for the UNSC. It has 
the sole power to determine whether a situation constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security or not and what measures to be used against 
such a threat. However, the UNSC does not legitimately operate outside the 
law but is acting in accordance with the law to the governance of world 
affairs.141   
 
The idea when the UN Charter was drafted was that the political approach 
would have predominance over the legal approach. The preparatory works 
reveals that the UNSC, as a political organ, was merely meant to act as 
dispute settler under Chapter VI and as peace enforcer under Chapter VII. 
Therefore the limit to the UNSC’s power is peace enforcement and must not 
                                                 
139 Ibid. p. 192. 
140 Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his dissenting opinion attached to the ICJ’s Advisory 
Opinion on Namibia (South West Africa) in 1971, ICJ Rep 291, at 294. para. 115.   
141 Bianchi Andrea, Assessing the Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-terrorism 
Measures: The Quest for Legitimacy and Cohesion, The European Journal of International 
Law Vol 17 no. 5 2007, p. 885.  
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be trespassed. The issue becomes somewhat problematic when considering 
the fact that the UNSC also decides what is necessary to keep or restore 
world peace.142    
 
In the backwash of the ‘War on Terror’ attention to the limits of the 
UNSC’s exercise of its powers under Chapter VII has been directed at the 
alleged violation of fundamental rights brought about by targeted sanctions. 
International legal scholars have stressed the purposes and principles of the 
UN Charter which would limit the UNSC power under Article 24(2) UN.143 
The principle of good faith and Article 1 UN would also further prohibit the 
organs of the UN from behaving contrary to the core elements of the human 
rights norms behind Article 1(3) UN.144
 
Another possibility to the limitation of the UNSC’s power follows from the 
above stated by claiming that Articles 55 and 56 UN would imply that the 
UNSC is also bound by declarations adopted by the General Assembly 
(UNGA) e.g. the UDHR as well as the ICCPR. These two international 
conventions would implement instruments of the obligations laid down in 
Articles 55 and 56 UN.145             
 
The UN is also said to be bound by general rules of international law. The 
UN, and the UNSC in particular, was judged to be bound by the peremptory 
norms of jus cogens in the Yusuf case. The reasoning follows the logic 
argumentation that if states may not derogate from these peremptory norms, 
neither should international organizations. If not, states could use 
international organization as an excuse for not acting in accordance with jus 
cogens.146   
                                                 
142 Ibid, p. 886. 
143 “In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the 
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security 
Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.” 
Article 24(2) UN.  
144 Bianchi, p. 886. 
145 Article 55 
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for 
peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: 
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development; 
 
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and 
international cultural and educational cooperation; and 
 
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
 
Article 56 
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the 
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. 
 
See also Bianchi, p. 886.   
146 Bianchi, p. 887. 
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When adopting its resolutions, the UNSC acts as a world law-maker. This 
has not always been the case however. In the mid 1940’s when the UN 
Charter was drafted, no one had anticipated that the subsequent practice of 
the organ would evolve to encompass a law-making activity to face 
international threats to the international legal order.147
 
As the nature of the threats to the international legal order has changed, so 
has the scope for the UNSC’s actions changed. With the threat of terrorism 
being constantly present on the global scene, the UNSC has taken drastic 
measures such as targeted sanctions and blacklists in the attempt to fight 
terrorism. The ultimate test of the legitimacy of the UNSC’s actions now 
remains at the level of acceptance of its practice by the member states of the 
UN.148    
 
3.3.3 The Legal Status of the UNSC Resolutions 
 
In the chapter above on the UN as a world law-maker, the discussion on 
how the UNSC’s power could be limited concerned the limitation of power 
for the UN organs in respect for fundamental rights, as protected by the 
Charter itself. In this part, I will revise whether the legally binding UNSC 
resolutions enjoys the same legal status as the Charter itself?    
 
The UNSC Resolutions could be regarded as part of the UN Charter system 
since the Charter is a framework treaty that has to be implemented by 
secondary legislation. The reasoning follows from the fact that a breach of 
the obligations in a Resolution may be seen as a breach of the provisions in 
the Charter empowering the UNSC to issue the resolution. Another view is 
that the UNSC Resolutions amend the Charter, thus a breach of the 
Resolutions would amount to a breach of the amended Charter. In any case, 
the members of the UN are prevented from ignoring the decisions of the 
UNSC and of breaching the provisions of the Charter by means of 
successive treaties according to Articles 25 and 103 UN respectively.149         
 
When having ascertained the obligations of the members of the UN under 
the Charter the question of what law is binding on the UN still remains 
unanswered.  
 
The issue of whether there exists any law that is binding on the UN is highly 
debated. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3.2.2, the UN could in fact be 
bound to follow human rights obligations due to the principle of good faith 
and Article 1(3).150 On the other hand, in accordance with Article 103 UN, 
the Charter prevails over any other obligation unless specifically stated. The 
                                                 
147 Ibid. 
148 Ibid.  
149 Lysén, p. 293. 
150 See Chapter 3.2.2  
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following reasoning follows the idea that there is nothing binding the UN 
unless explicitly stated.151
 
To start with, the UN is not bound by its members’ obligations under 
international law unless it is stated in the Charter. Neither is the UN bound 
by any treaty it has not ratified, according to Article 34(1) of the VCLT.152 
A consequence of this would be that the UN is not even bound by the 
UDHR or the ICCPR, since the UN has not declared itself to be bound.153 
The UNSC therefore has a great discretion when it comes to implementing 
resolutions. However, the notion that the UNSC as a UN organ would be 
bound by human rights obligation is not too far fetched considering the 
obligation to respect human rights stated in the UN Charter e.g. in Article 
1(3) UN and the peremptory norms of jus cogens.   
 
 
3.4 A Change in International Law? 
 
3.4.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
Every legal system needs to able to develop its rules to take into account the 
evolution and changing exigencies of the society it regulates. The 
international legal system is characterized by the absence of a body 
specifically entitled to create legal rules binding on all its subjects. Instead, 
international law is created by states and therefore also changed by states.154 
The UN system is of no difference. The question of greatest interest for this 
thesis is whether the international legal system has changed due to the threat 
of terrorism? And if yes, could one use the possible change in international 
law to justify the breach of fundamental rights?155
                                                 
151 See Lysén, Chapter 3. What law is binding of the UN? P. 293 ff. 
152 “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its 
consent.” Article 34 of the VCLT. 
153 Lysén, p. 293.  
154 Duffy Helen, The “War on Terror” and the Framework of International Law, 
Cambridge University Press 2005, p 7. 
155 The issue may be the subject for a completely new paper, however, it is interesting in 
this context to examine the possibility that one could make out a change in the international 
legal system and ultimately if the rules protecting fundamental rights can be changed?  
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 3.4.2  The Change of Customary International 
Law 
 
The change of treaty-based rules of international law, as defined in Article 
31 VCLT,  is fairly straight forward. The customary rules of international 
law, however, require a more thorough procedure. Customary international 
law comes into existence when most states of the international community 
follow a certain course of action believing that it is required by a legal norm. 
When these states cease to support the consistent and general practice and 
the opinion juris supporting those ceases, the rules lose their binding force 
and eventually changes.156  
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the practice of the states responding to the 
incidents, and the reactions to those responses, assumes particular 
significance in a system where departure from existing legal standards may 
ultimately impact on those standards.157 However, it is important to stress 
that not every violation of an international rule automatically leads to a 
change in the law. In most cases, not even consistent patterns of violations 
imply that a rule has been superseded, as the obligatory nature of a rule of 
customary law is lost only if the behavior of those states which refuse to 
comply with the rule, and the reactions of other states, are supported by the 
belief that the rule is no longer binding.158    
 
Some rules of customary international law are particularly difficult to 
change. The peremptory norms, or jus cogens norms, have been defined by 
the ILC as: 
 
Substantive rules of conduct that prohibit what has come to be seen as intolerable because of 
the threat it presents to the survival of States and their peoples and the most basic human 
values.159  
 
A norm of jus cogens character can be changed only by a subsequent norm 
of general law having the same character according to Article 53 of the 
VCLT. To determine a norm of jus cogens to be changed or no longer 
existing requires a universal state practice and strong evidence indicating 
that the value it protects is no longer considered fundamental by the 
international community. Basic human rights e.g. are therefore extremely 
difficult to change.160  
 
                                                 
156 Duffy, p. 8.  
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid.  
159 ILC Commentaires to Articles on State Responsibility, Commentary to Article 40(3); 
Duffy, p. 8, note 32.   
160 Duffy, p. 9. 
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Having the judgment of the CFI in the Yusuf case in mind, the Community 
does not seem to regard the right to a fair hearing or any other fundamental 
right to be changed or none existing. However, the protection of 
fundamental rights has undoubtedly had to make way for the protection of 
international peace and security. What is also clear is that the practice of 
“blacklisting” has created a legal uncertainty when it comes to e.g. the 
presentation of evidence. To state the obvious, the situation for the universal 
protection of fundamental rights has, if not changed, at least been modified 
to fit the fight against terrorism.  
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4 Future aspects on the 
protection of fundamental 
rights  
4.1 The European Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and the Lisbon Treaty 
 
4.1.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
The introduction of fundamental rights in Community law has greatly 
influenced the Community, granting the citizens of the Union a wide range 
of protection as well as limiting the Community institutions’ powers. As 
previously mentioned, fundamental rights have derived from constitutional 
traditions of the Member States and from various international treaties as 
well as from the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The result of this development is that nowadays we deal not only 
with fundamental freedoms, but we also distinguish fundamental rights in 
the Community context. The latter, opposed to fundamental freedoms 
concentrate on the individual, instead of the common market. It is important 
to emphasize that the newly developed rights are considered equally 
important. The ECJ in order to uphold the fundamental freedoms found it 
necessary to refer to human rights. In result, the ECJ’s grounds for 
jurisdiction were broadened. The rights were introduced by the ECJ as a 
restraint upon the Community institutions, and not as a restraint of the 
powers of the Member States.161  
 
The development of the protection of fundamental rights has been a subject 
of much controversy with the failure of the Constitution of Europe, where 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR) was 
included.162 The Lisbon Treaty, as agreed upon in December 2007, will only 
contain a reference to the Charter. The reference is found in Article 6 of the 
Lisbon Treaty where it is also stated that the EU will accede to the ECHR. I 
will go deeper into this issue later on in this chapter. First, it is vital to 
examine whether the introduction of the EUCFR into primary Community 
                                                 
161 Craig Paul and De Búrca Gráinne, p. 381.   
162 The Constitutional Treaty was rejected by France and the Netherlands in 2005, found on 
the EU Institutional Reform webpage, available at: 
http://europa.eu/institutional_reform/index_en.htm   
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law will enable for countries like Sweden to live up to its commitments to 
fully respect fundamental rights?163
 
4.2 The Introduction of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union 
 
4.2.1 Background to the Elaboration of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights  
 
The Council elaborated the EUCFR during the German presidency in 1999. 
The idea was to include a fundamental rights charter into the EU to clarify 
that Community law is based on shared values that would include 
fundamental rights and civil rights common to the Member States. A 
Charter of Fundamental Rights would be the best way of securing the future 
protection of fundamental rights within the Community legal order.164  
 
From the beginning, the EUCFR was never intended to be a legally binding 
document, but simply a political commitment. Even at the time of its 
signing, by the European Parliament and the European Council jointly, in 
December 2000 the adoption was still a political declaration without any 
legal force. However, as time progressed the EUCFR has proven to be a 
source of inspiration for both national courts and Community courts, 
including the CFI as well as the ECJ.165  
 
The EUCFR as such is based upon the fundamental rights and freedoms 
recognised by the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
constitutional traditions of the EU Member States, the Council of Europe's 
Social Charter, the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of 
Workers and other international conventions to which the European Union 
or its Member States are parties.166
 
I will not go into detail of the set of rules contained in the EUCFR, but 
merely stress the importance of the legally binding effect of a fundamental 
rights charter for the safeguarding of civil, political, economic and social 
rights of European citizens.167  
                                                 
163 The Lisbon Treaty, Article 6(1) and (2); The Treaty at a Glance, official homepage of 
the Treaty of Lisbon, available at: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/glance/index_en.htm.    
164 Lindfelt, p. 4 ff. See supra. n. 11.  
165 Lindfelt, p. 7. 
166 The European Parliament’s official homepage for the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union, available at : http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm.   
167 Ibid. The importance here is not to state every rule of the EUCFR and thoroughly 
examine these, since that theme is enough for a thesis of its own, but instead show the 
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 4.2.2 The Effect of the Adoption of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights     
 
By including the charter of fundamental rights, it will give legal binding 
effect to the fundamental rights. Therefore, the Treaty of Lisbon will add a 
new dimension to the EC as such and in particular to the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ. Hence, the Court will be provided with more solid grounds for 
their judgments, as far as fundamental rights are concerned.  
 
Without going deeper into the specific provisions for the protection of 
certain rights, it could be of interest to mention that the right to a fair trial, 
the presumption of innocence, the principle of legality and proportionality 
of penalties as well as the right to an effective remedy, will become binding 
upon the Community institutions through the adoption of the Lisbon 
Treaty.168   
 
Even if the Treaty provides the Community courts with a catalogue of rights 
which they must protect, the Lisbon Treaty itself asserts no new power or 
task for the EC or the EU. This can be deduced from Article 51(2) EUCFR. 
However, the legally binding nature presents a minimum standard of 
protection for fundamental rights in the EU. Article 52(1) EUCFR states 
that any limitation of the exercise of the rights and freedoms contained in 
the Charter must be provided for by law.169 Limitations must also meet the 
requirements of proportionality and must be: 
 
(…)necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union, or 
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 170     
 
With the new powerful protection of fundamental rights in the EU, and the 
continuous jurisdiction of the ECtHR as an observer of fundamental rights 
protection, we have a situation where two courts will apply two different 
catalogues. The question is whether the extended protection will create a 
greater legal certainty for the citizens of the EU? 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
impact of a legally binding catalogue of fundamental rights on the Community legal 
system.  The EUCFR becomes legally binding when the Lisbon Treaty will be ratified in 
every Member State. According to the Swedish Parliament’s Information Centre for the EU 
(EU upplysningen), the ambition is for the Treaty to come into force in 2009, available at 
www.eu-upplysningen.se .    
168 Article 47 EUFCR ; Craig and de Búrca, p. 414.  
169 Craig and de Búrca, p. 415. 
170 Article 52(1) EUCFR; Craig and de Búrca, p. 415.  
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4.2.2.1 The ECJ and the ECtHR – Dual Protection of 
Fundamental Rights? 
 
The relationship between the ECHR, other international human rights 
instruments, national constitutional provisions, and the new Charter is 
addressed in Articles 52(3) and 53 EUCFR. The relationship between the 
EUCFR and the ECHR is a source for much debate. For instance, questions 
such as whether a right contained in the new Charter should necessarily be 
interpreted in the same way as a similar right contained in the ECHR, or of 
the proper relationship between the ECJ and the ECtHR, are worth 
emphasizing.171      
 
Article 52(3) relates specifically to the former issue and intends to 
harmonize the provisions of the ECHR and the EUCFR.172 The provision 
promotes harmonization while not preventing the EU from developing more 
extensive protection than is provided for under the ECHR.173 To avoid 
diverging interpretations of provisions similar in content with the new 
Charter and the ECHR, as well as with the ECJ and the ECtHR, the scope of 
the guaranteed rights are included within the case law of the ECtHR and the 
ECJ as stated in the preamble to the EUCFR.174
 
The ECHR is to be seen as a set of minimum standards, in relation to the 
EUCFR, and therefore the level of protection in the new Charter can never 
be inferior regardless of the wording of the Charter.175 It is however clear 
that the dual system for the protection of fundamental rights could be 
troublesome at times, in particular if the ECJ is faced with issues that have 
not previously been dealt with by the ECtHR. Nevertheless, it is important 
to remember that the ECHR and the EUCFR have great resemblance and the 
EUCFR is based on fundamental rights already applicable within the 
Community legal order. The new Charter will not replace the present system 
of the protection of fundamental rights, but merely make the present system 
more visible.176           
     
4.2.3 Accession to the ECHR 
 
The introduction of the Lisbon Treaty will lead to another significant change 
– the EU will become a party to the ECHR. The same Article of the 
                                                 
171 Craig and de Búrca, p. 416. 
172 “3. In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning 
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.” Article 52(3) 
EUCFR. 
173 Craig and de Búrca, p. 416. 
174 Lindfelt, p. 147. 
175 Ibid, p. 144. 
176 Ibid, p. 148 f.  
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EUCFCR that acknowledges the adoption of the EUCFR also contains a 
provision for the EU to accede to the ECHR.177  Consequently, the ECHR 
and the case-law of the ECtHR will constitute solid grounds for legal 
judgments of the ECJ. Accession to the ECHR could also lead to greater 
legal certainty for the citizens of the Union. The previous practice of 
referring to the constitutional traditions of the Member States was arguably 
contradictory to the idea of equality and legal certainty. With the 
introduction of the official catalogue of fundamental rights such practice 
will be avoidable.  
 
The argument from the European Parliament, the Commission and several 
Member States of the EU was that the adoption of the Charter and accession 
by the EU to the ECHR would complement each other in a similar fashion 
as Member States have their own constitutions.178  
 
The accession to the ECHR will further imply a transfer of competences 
from sovereign states to international organizations. The Member States of 
the EU will transfer competences to the EU while at the same time being 
contracting parties to the ECHR. This way Member States will not risk 
being held responsible for the infringement of fundamental rights, falling 
within the competences of the institutions of the EU.179 Accession would 
further contribute to a coherent protection of fundamental rights in Europe. 
The problems of conflicting interpretations by the ECJ and the ECtHR 
would be less frequent since the two courts would be more dependent upon 
each other and work more closely. The ECtHR could have the possibility to 
review the compatibility of acts adopted by the EU institutions and the 
ECHR. Consequently, the responsibility to defend acts of the EU 
institutions would shift from national level to EU level.180
 
So, with a watertight protection for fundamental rights within the EU, does 
the same apply for the citizens of the EU at a universal level?    
 
4.2.4 The Lisbon Treaty – A Legal Safeguard for 
the Future Protection of Fundamental Rights? 
 
 
When the EU accedes to the ECHR and the EUCFR becomes legally 
binding the EU has every potential to go its own way in the protection of 
fundamental rights, even if it implies opposing the UNSC.   
 
As demonstrated previously in this paper, the ECJ was willing to review the 
Common Position in the Segi case. The critic might state that the ECJ was 
                                                 
177 See supra n. 149.  
178 Lindfelt, p. 262. 
179 Lenaerts, K in Lindfelt, p. 263.  
180 Lindfelt, p. 263. 
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only willing to review the legality of the blacklist since it did not originate 
from a UNSC Resolution, but from a Common Position.181  It is true that the 
ECJ was willing to review the Common Position (even if it refrained from it 
in the end) perhaps mostly because it had no direct obligation to the UNSC. 
Nonetheless, it illustrates how the Community courts are willing to secure 
the protection for fundamental rights when it concerns internal EU 
decisions.  
 
In the future it will become even more important that the EU also considers 
itself to be able to review acts of the UN, despite the obligation to comply 
with the decisions of the UNSC. The Member States have equally a 
responsibility to stand up for the protection of fundamental rights for their 
citizens.    
 
Professor Iain Cameron at the University of Uppsala is particularly 
concerned with the negligence of fundamental rights protection in the EU. 
He considers that the Member States must take action and vindicate its 
competence. However, Cameron recognizes the difficulty for the national 
courts of the Member States to go against Community law. Therefore, it 
would be of greatest importance if the ECJ would judge, and thereby 
elucidate, the blacklisting of Al Barakaat and Mr Yusuf to violate 
fundamental rights.182   
 
Finally, the accession to the ECHR will nonetheless imply that the EU as an 
organization is legally bound to respect human rights. In the past the EU has 
integrated the ECHR and the fundamental rights protection in the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States in its judgments. However, 
the ECJ has theoretically still had a significant independence in its field of 
application. The supervisory character of the ECtHR could well secure the 
observance of fundamental rights protection within the institutions of the 
EU. Most Member States have a well founded protection system in their 
national constitutions and with the same level of protection at the EU level it 
seems like fundamental rights protection will see a brighter future. In the 
end, much will depend upon the willingness of both the EU and its Member 
States to comply with the level of protection established within the Union.  
 
The legal system for the protection is still vulnerable in that it creates no 
guarantee that the EU or certain Member States will not go against the 
ECHR, EUCFR or constitutions of the Member States to comply with the 
decision of the UNSC.   
                                                 
181 See Chapter 2.5.2.   
182 Knutson, Tom Tveksamt om EG-domstolen ger Somaliasvenskar upprättelse, 
Advokaten, No. 4 2008 Vol. 74, found at: 
http://www.advokatsamfundet.se/templates/CommonPage_Advokaten.aspx?id=8181. 
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4.3 The Future Aspect – What Can Be 
Done?  
 
4.3.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
It is important at this stage to emphasize the necessity of creating a practice 
for the protection of fundamental rights that involves the respect for 
international law and human rights. Anders Kruse holds that if we are ever 
going to win the war on terror we need to secure the genuine support of 
ordinary citizens in the societies involved. Unless ordinary men and women 
are convinced that the war is carried out under the rule of law and respect 
for the fundamental rights, it can never be won.183 Kruse finalizes the 
argumentation by stating that: 
 
Respect for the rule of law establishes legitimacy, and legitimacy is needed for a successful 
fight against terrorism.184  
 
By acceding to the ECHR and adopting the EUCFR as legally binding, we 
are closer than ever to have a complete system for the protection of 
fundamental rights in the EU. The Community courts can no longer only 
refer to particular constitutional provisions of the Member States or 
provisions in the ECHR, but will in fact be forced to respect the provisions 
of international treaties such as the ECHR. This implies a strong sense of 
legitimacy for actions taken by the Member States and the institutions of the 
EU, in particular. Still, the mere fact that the EU will accede to the ECHR is 
perhaps not a guarantee to secure the respect for fundamental rights. So to 
use the phrasing of Kruse, what needs to be done?185
 
4.3.2 How to Secure the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights and Still Fight Terrorism? 
 
To sum up what have been discussed previously in this paper, and to state 
what Kruse has proposed, the first thing would be to make sure there is a 
satisfactory level of evidence before undertaking any kind of measures 
against alleged terrorists. The thresholds are too low and the level of 
                                                 
183 Kruse, p. 217. 
184 Ibid.  
185 Ibid. 219. 
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connection to Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups in the Resolutions of the 
UNSC gives no clear guidance due to its vagueness.186     
 
The second necessary change is to grant every individual who is targeted by 
the Resolution blacklists the right to be heard and defend himself against the 
allegations.187 To increase the credibility with the blacklisting system it is 
vital that the individuals are granted the same rights as any other individuals 
in a democratic state. Even though many of the individuals on the blacklists 
might be responsible for the funding of terrorist actions, I do not see how 
democratic states can ever battle terrorism with the same methods as non-
democratic states. Therefore, the basis of the allegations must be presented 
to these individuals and the use of secret evidence e.g. intelligence material 
must be reduced as much as possible.188  
 
The possibility to defend oneself and take part of evidence would have no 
effect if there is no access to court or an equivalent legal body. The 
possibility to access a court of law is therefore necessary to establish a full 
judicial protection for the targeted individual. An independent legal body 
must be given the opportunity to review the decisions of the EU to establish 
a credibly system. For decisions taken by the UN or UNSC the idea to 
create a separate body within the UN system with the task of reviewing the 
legality of the decisions is not too far fetched.189  
 
These three major changes could amount to a far better protection for 
fundamental rights in the future.   
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5 Swedish national legislation 
concerning the fight against 
terrorism and the political 
debate in the aftermath of the 
Yusuf case  
 
5.1 Swedish National Legislation on 
Terrorism 
5.1.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
As a member of both the EN and the EU, Sweden is obliged to pursue the 
decisions of both organizations. When the EU issues Common Positions, 
these are not immediately binding, but needs to be implemented through 
national legislative measures. However, when it comes to economic 
sanctions, these are under the competence of the Community. The 
regulations that conclude on the freezing of funds are therefore directly 
binding upon the Member States at the time of the issuance.190 Under 
international law, Sweden is in fact prohibited from taking actions of its 
own to carry out economic sanctions since these falls under the scope of the 
competence of the Community. Only when the EU is averted from carrying 
out the decisions may the Member States act on its own. However, as a 
Member State, Sweden has the responsibility to take measures against 
anyone who violates the provisions of the sanctions.191   
 
Since every state is sovereign, states can only be bound by international law 
through the consent of the supremacy of international law, including EU 
law. Like any other member of the UN and the EU, Sweden has given its 
consent to be bound by the provisions of the Treaties of the EU and the EC, 
as well as the UN Charter. The consent is to be found in the Instrument of 
Government (RF) 10 ch. 5§ of the Swedish constitution.192 Sweden is 
therefore a dualistic country in the sense that it takes specific internal 
                                                 
190 Swedish Government Official Reports on International Sanctions, 2006:41 
(Internationella Sanktioner, SOU 2006:41), p. 54. 
191 Ibid. p. 47.  
192 The provision gives that the Government of Sweden can transfer power of the right of 
decision to the EU except in the area concerning the polity, RF 10:5.   
 51
judicial measures to enable the application of international treaty provisions 
internally in the national judicial system.193        
 
Under the 1267-regime, states are not obliged to do more than simply make 
sure that the Resolutions are followed and that those individuals on the 
blacklist have their assets frozen. The procedure requires no active 
legislative process from the Member States of the EU, but instead its 
implementation depends on the EU. The Community adopts Regulations, 
containing the lists, which become directly applicable in every Member 
State. To reiterate what has been previously mentioned in this paper, the EU 
is bound by the UNSC decisions as a result of the Member States’ transfer 
of power to the EU; in this case in the area of financial sanctions on third 
states.194     
 
Under the second regime, the 1373-regime, the UN does not provide the 
members with any lists, but instead the members are incumbent to 
criminalize willful funding of terrorist actions.195 The EU can decide to 
adopt Regulations or Common Positions, which it has done including the 
setting up of its own blacklists.196 The Member States may also adopt laws 
to carry out the decisions of the UN or the EU.       
 
To live up to the obligations under international law Sweden has adopted 
several laws aiming at carrying out the decisions of the UNSC and the EU. 
For the purpose of this thesis simply the laws that concern the financing of 
terrorism will be touched upon. The political debate that has aroused since 
the Yusuf case and the question whether there are any means to oppose the 
UNSC will also be examined.  
 
5.1.2 The Prerequisite for the Implementation of 
National Legilslative Measures 
 
As mentioned above, the provision where Sweden has transferred power to 
legislate to the EU is found in 10 ch. 5§ RF. The provision also applies to 
decisions of the UNSC. Furthermore, the paragraph contains a stipulation 
that the respect for fundamental rights in the area of co-operation to which 
the power have been transferred to, is equivalent to the level of protection 
provided by the RF and the ECHR.197  
 
Shortly after the time of the freezing of the funds for the three Somalia 
Swedes and the Al Barakaat, the Swedish Government opposed the decision 
                                                 
193 Ibid. p. 193.  
194 Ibid. p. 87; See also Chapter 3.1.3. 
195 Internationella Sanktioner, SOU 2006:41, p. 98. 
196 The EU has since the Common Position 2001/931/GUSP carried out its own lists 
containing the names of individuals and entities suspected of having engaged in terrorist 
activities, Internationella Sanktioner, SOU 2006:41, p. 101.  
197 Ibid. p. 72.  
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by the UNSC on the grounds that it violated Sweden’s constitutional 
obligations as well as the ECHR.198 However, the Swedish Government has 
also stated that even though it considers the work of the Committee under 
Resolution 1267 to lack in respect for fundamental rights it is still self-
evident that Sweden will remain loyal to the decisions of the UNSC.199 I 
will get back to this issue at a later stage.  
 
When it comes to the authorization of the Member States to act nationally 
concerning international sanctions, the TEU provides the Member States 
with directions for their foreign policy. If the EU has decided upon a 
Common Position it is indicative for the actions of the Member States. 
Article 15 TEU states that Member States must make sure their foreign 
policy is in line with the Common Positions of the EU. If the issue falls 
under the scope of the Community the Member States are prohibited from 
taking actions of their own. This is the case with economic sanctions, as 
mentioned above. The logic of this reasoning is that the Member States are 
free to decide upon sanctions when there is no Common Position. The 
freedom is not unlimited, however, since Article 11 TEU provides the 
Member States with general rules that narrows the competence to act. 
According to the latter provision, the EU shall affirm and realize a common 
foreign- and security policy. The Member States shall actively and loyally 
support the policy and the Member States are further on encouraged to work 
jointly in a sense of solidarity with the Union as well as one another.200     
 
The previously stated implies that the Member States must refrain from 
acting in a way that would be at variance with the politics of the EU.  
    
5.1.3 Sanktionslagen (1996:95) and 
Finansieringslagen (2002:444) – The Swedish 
Sanctions Act and the Swedish Financing Act201  
 
Both the Sanctions and the Financing Acts intend to criminalize acts of 
terrorism under Resolution 1373. When the EU implements Resolution 
1373 and creates a joint list for targeted individuals and entities it differs 
between EU citizens and non-EU citizens. The EU has complete mandate to 
realize the duties of the Member States regarding the implementation of the 
sanctions when is comes to non-EU citizens. As regards the EU-citizens it is 
up to the Member States to carry out the sanctions.202   
 
                                                 
198 The Swedish Government requested to the Sanctions Committee, through two note 
verbales, to have the three Swedish citizens and the entity removed from the blacklist. The 
request resulted in a hearing before the Committee where two of the suspected terrorists 
were removed from the list. See Yusuf, paras. 317-18.    
199 Internationella Sanktioner, SOU 2006:41, p. 72.  
200 Ibid. p. 67. 
201 The English translation is solely my own and has as far as I know no official translation.  
202 Ibid. p. 102. 
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Sanktionslagen (1996:95) gives the Government of Sweden the mandate to 
carry out the necessary actions as regards the observance of the sanctions. 
However, by 2006, the Swedish Government had not yet realized any 
sanctions towards EU-citizens in accordance with Resolution 1373.203  
 
Without going into detail of the specific provisions of the Act it is only 
worth while mentioning that the scope of application is somewhat diffuse 
since it is not clear whether individuals can be targeted or only states, 
regimes or other third states.204     
 
Finansieringslagen (2002:444) contains provisions for the implementation 
of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism. The Swedish Act implies a right for Swedish authorities to 
penalize those who supplies or receives money or other assets with the 
intention of using these to commit acts of terrorism.205       
 
The conclusion of the existing provisions in the Swedish Acts is that at 
present Sweden is not able to fully carry out the freezing of assets as 
Resolution 1373 requires. The national procedural and criminal law does not 
provide the sufficient provisions to freeze assets, why the full 
implementation is unsatisfactory.206 Sweden has neither a satisfactory 
legislation to enable immediate freezing of assets under the 1267-regime. 
During the time of the actual listing by the Sanctions Committee to the time 
of action by the EU, there is a gap of a few of days. During these couple of 
days the individuals can dispose non-restrictively over the assets before the 
EU acts and implements the list as binding upon the Member States. As 
previously mentioned, the Member States have obligations to carry out 
decisions by the UN, in spite of the actions by the EU. Therefore, a 
commission of inquiry on the possibility to allow for interlocutory orders to 
freeze the assets was appointed by the Swedish Government in 2006. The 
outcome is still pending. 
                                                 
203 Ibid.  
204 See 2§ of Sanktionslagen (1996:95).  
205 See 1-3§§ of Finansieringslagen (2002:444). 
206 Internationella Sanktioner, SOU 2006:41, p. 106 f.  
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 5.2 In the Aftermath of the Yusuf Case – 
The Political Debate and the Possibility 
For Redress 
5.2.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
The Yusuf and the Kadi cases were the first cases where a Community court 
judged upon the validity of UNSC sanctions, although contested through a 
Regulation adopted by the EU. The issue is multi-faceted in that it touches 
upon many legal areas and dimensions of international politics thus, giving 
rise to much controversy. The EU has by resigning from the observance of 
the protection of fundamental rights, declared that the EU has no power to 
secure the protection of these. I believe the EU has a responsibility for its 
citizens given the fact that the Member States have voluntarily given up part 
of their sovereignty and entrusted the EU with a task to act on their behalf, 
including the securing of fundamental rights.       
 
One could easily argue that the area of politics is not really relevant for a 
legal thesis. On the other hand to argue that politics is separate from law 
would be to state the untrue. To use the opinions of Professor Inger 
Österdahl at Uppsala University, politics and law are separated only by a 
very thin line.207 In the Yusuf case this was particularly blunt since the CFI 
argued it could neither review the Regulation nor lay down that the basic 
fundamental rights in our constitutional state had been violated. The 
decisions of the UNSC and the EU, in the field of international sanctions, 
affect countless people daily, not only in the parts of the world where the 
battle against terrorism is fought, but also here in our democratic part of the 
world.  
 
So what could the political debate give the future as regards better 
protection for fundamental rights and is there any way for Mr. Yusuf or 
Barakaat to hope for redress? 
 
5.2.2 The Political Debate 
 
After having studied the political debate in Sweden in several journals it is 
clear that most authors do not accept the judgment of the CFI, neither the 
fact that the Swedish Government carried out the decision to freeze the 
assets of the three individuals without any heavy protesting. 
 
                                                 
207 Österdahl, Inger FN, EU, sanktioner och mänskliga rättigheter – domen i EU:s 
Förstainstansrätt, SvJT 2006 s. 377.  
 55
Thomas Hammarberg, the Commissioner for Human Rights at the Council 
of Europe, holds that Sweden should have been disobedient and refused to 
carry out the sanctions. Sweden had the choice to protect human rights, 
which form part of Sweden’s constitution, but instead chose to follow the U 
N, thus breaching its own constitution. Mr Hammarberg does not consider 
the refusal to follow UNSC Resolutions to undermine the authority of the 
UN. On the contrary, he considers that our obedience with the decision of 
the UNSC and the consequences it has conduced would undermine the UN 
far more.208
 
Professor Österdahl considers that the passive approach to review the the 
UNSC decisions is not exclusive to the CFI. According to Österdahl, the 
ECtHR is surprisingly passive when it comes to accepting the UNSC as the 
guardian for international peace and security. In response to the judgment in 
the Yusuf case, the ECtHR considered that the primary means of legal 
redress was the national courts, why the ECtHR argued that it was up to the 
national courts, and in the end Community courts, to secure the protection 
of fundamental rights in the EU.209   
 
Like Mr Hammarberg, Professor Österdahl argues further that the CFI did 
not have to disclaim its mandate to review the legality of the Regulation in 
the Yusuf case. The CFI argued in its judgment that to judge whether Mr 
Yusuf constituted a threat to international peace and security would be too 
political, why it chose to refrain from such a review. However, Österdahl 
argues that since the UNSC’s power is not absolute but in fact limited by 
international law as well as the UN Charter, the CFI was wrong in that it 
was undue to perform such a review.210 The CFI could instead have claimed 
a right to evaluate whether the judgment was within the limits of the power 
of the UNSC.211  
 
Professor Cameron, goes along the same line as the two previous scholars 
and is perhaps even more explicit in his views of the judgment in the Yusuf 
case, which he refers to as a “judicial abdication”. 212 Cameron argues that if 
one would interpret the judgment literally there are no limits to the decisions 
of the UNSC, genocide excluded, and the Member States of the EU are 
obliged to pursue the decisions. Cameron also fears that if we grant too 
much power to the UNSC this could have severe consequences for the 
future, given the growing political influence of semi- or non-democratic 
states such as Russia or China.213    
 
Cameron believes that the balance of power in the international community 
will never strike even if not the ECJ clearly opposes the UNSC. He is not 
                                                 
208 Truedson, Lars, ”Härvan av kränkningar måste röjas upp” Fredstidningen PAX, 
Svenska freds, Issue 4-5 2006, found at: http://www.svenskafreds.se/pax/tidigare/06-4-
5/senaste.shtml.  
209 Supra. n. 186. 
210 See, inter alia, Chapter 3.3.2.  
211 Österdahl, s. 378.  
212 Supra. n. 169.  
213 Ibid. 
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too optimistic, however, given the amount of pressure the ECJ is under to 
remain loyal to the UNSC when judging in the appeal by Al Barakaat 
sometime during the fall of 2008.214  
 
 
5.2.3 The Possibility for Redress 
 
Mr. Yusuf was without legal rights for over five years. He could neither 
travel or work nor make use of his financial assets. In any case, Mr. Yusuf 
was taken off the list before the appeal to the ECJ why his case will not be 
tried in the Court. Of the original claim, only the organization Al Barakaat 
remains on the blacklist and the ECJ will give its judgment sometime during 
the fall 2008.215     
 
The Advocate General (AG) Poires Maduro argues in the Opinion to the 
pending case C-415/05 from January 23, 2008 that as long as there is no rule 
of law regarding the review of the sanctions within the UN, it is for the EU 
to provide such review. The AG considers the Regulation, under which the 
Al Barakaat was targeted, conflicted with the right to judicial review and 
shall therefore be declared null and void. The Swedish Government has 
hitherto remained negative to the opinion of the AG and adheres to the idea 
that the protection for fundamental rights must be secured within the UN 
system, not at an EU or national level.216  
 
There are a few examples of states where the Governments have opposed 
the decisions of the UNSC and simply refused to carry out the sanctions. 
One example that received much attention was the case of the Canadian 
citizen Liban Hussein, who was put on the sanctions list and had his 
resources frozen. Canada, as opposed to Sweden, refused to carry out the 
freezing of the funds and annulled the sanction decision. This was 
performed after viewing the evidence against him. The decision was 
subsequently followed by the UN, who removed him off the list.217
 
The case illustrates the possibility to successfully oppose the UNSC. If it 
has created a greater legal certainty is hard to say, but in the particular case 
one could easily state that it has. 
 
                                                 
214 Mr. Yusuf has been removed from the list, thus only Al Barakaat that remains on the list 
can appeal the judgment in the original Yusuf case. Knutson, 
http://www.advokatsamfundet.se/templates/CommonPage_Advokaten.aspx?id=8181. 
The appeal C-415/05 is still pending.       
215 Hårdh Robert, Wengmark Anna, Klasén Bo, de Geer Sten, Gottgörelse till de rättslösa 
Svenska Helsingforskommittén Newsdesk, found at: 
http://www.newsdesk.se/pressroom/svenska_helsingforskommitten_foer_maenskliga_raetti
gheter/pressrelease/view/gottgoerelse-till-de-raettsloesa-206766.   
216 Ibid.  
217 Supra. n. 207.  
 57
In any case, the outcome in the case that is pending before the ECJ at the 
moment is hard to predict. The ECJ can either chose to follow the AG or 
remain loyal to the UNSC. One thing is clear; if states continue to follow the 
UNSC without objection we will probably not see an increasing legal 
certainty for targeted individuals in the near future.  
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6 Conclusions 
6.1 Conclusions of the Thesis 
 
So what are the possibilities for countries like Sweden to live up to its 
obligations to EU- and International law as well as its own constitution? As 
a member of both the EU and the UN, Sweden has transposed much of its 
sovereignty and judicial powers to intergovernmental organizations. Even if 
Sweden would want to act in accordance with the respect for fundamental 
rights it is difficult to give effect to without also breaching international- or 
EU law. The Yusuf case is perhaps one of the best examples to illustrate the 
complexity of the situation.   
 
While Sweden has a long tradition of protecting fundamental rights, it has 
proven inevitable for Sweden to give way on some of these accounts. The 
increasing threats of terrorist acts around the world have created a world 
where the fear for terrorism has grown to enormous proportions. In the view 
of the incidents of 9/11 that fear is justified. However, we seem to have 
forgotten about the basic fundamental rights along the way. Like most other 
EU countries, Sweden has a constitution where the respect for fundamental 
rights is specifically stated. As the Yusuf case has demonstrated, the respect 
for national constitutions must sometime submit to the obligations of 
international Treaties. In as much as the EU and the UN are organizations 
once founded as giant peace projects, they also have the power to decide 
upon its members’ foreign policy. Further on, the UNSC has even been 
trusted with the specific role of deciding upon what situations constitute of a 
threat to international peace and security. This is the package deal of 
acceding to intergovernmental organizations.         
 
So, how can Sweden protect fundamental rights or to reiterate one of the 
research questions, are the UNSC Resolutions in accordance with Sweden’s 
obligations to respect fundamental rights as under international law and EU 
law? The question is complex in itself since Sweden has legal obligations to 
its own constitution as well as under international- and EU law. At the same 
time, both the EU and the UN have obligations to observe fundamental 
rights according to the TEU, the EC Treaty and the UN Charter. The role of 
the UNSC as the international observer of peace and security and the 
prevailing nature of the UN Charter has nevertheless created a legal 
safeguard for the institutions of the UN to circumvent the obligations 
somewhat. Undoubtedly the international community has agreed to grant the 
UNSC with the power to observe international peace and security, why the 
actions of the latter can never be contradictory to the mission of securing 
international security.  
 
However, neither the UNSC, nor the UN has an unrestrained power to act 
upon. The purpose of the UN is for every member to act with respect to 
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international peace and justice which includes the respect for human rights. 
This can be deduced from Article 1 UN where the principle of good faith 
would prohibit the organs of the UN from behaving contrary to the core 
elements of the human rights norms behind Article 1(3) UN. Another 
possibility to the limitation of the UNSC’s power follows from Article 24(2) 
which affirms that he UNSC must act in accordance with the purpose of the 
UN.  
 
According to Bianchi, the UN itself could also be legally bound by 
declarations adopted by the UNGA such as the UDHR as well as the ICCPR 
in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 UN. These two international 
conventions would implement instruments of the obligations laid down in 
Articles 55 and 56 UN. On the other hand, scholars like Lysén have argued 
that the UN never can be legally bound by any Treaty obligation it has not 
consent to and finds the legal base for his arguments in Article 34 VCLT 
and Article 103 UN.  
 
To go so far as to maintain that international law has changed would be to 
go too far. For a norm of jus cogens to be said to have changed or become 
null and void it would require a universal state practice and strong evidence 
indicating that the value it protects is no longer considered fundamental by 
the international community. Even if states would refuse to comply with 
some customary rules of international law it is too early to state that there 
has been such profound change in the practice of states as to give evidence 
to a change of fundamental rights protection. The argument that we would 
have a new set of rules of jus cogens that would replace the current ones is 
just not legally credible.   
 
I believe that the UN must be said to be held responsible for breaching 
fundamental rights with reference to the purpose of the UN as well as the 
peremptory rules of jus cogens. If we slip too much power to the UNSC 
there could be a danger for the future. To recite Cameron, the problem with 
a too strong UNSC could be even more manifestable in the future when 
Russia and China, who are not known for their adherence to the protection 
of fundamental rights, will have an increase of power globally. 
 
If we go back to the Yusuf case and the question whether EC Regulations or 
Common Positions are in accordance with Sweden’s obligations to the EU 
the answer at first glance would be, yes. Sweden is obliged to follow EC 
Regulations and to act in accordance with Common Positions by virtue of 
Sweden’s treaty obligations, i.e. the TEU and the EC Treaty. The principle 
of loyalty in Article 10 EC obliges every Member State to carry out the 
decisions of the Community with loyalty to the latter. Article 103 UN and 
the dubious judgment by the CFI in the Yusuf case further implies that not 
only are Member States obliged to follow EC Regulations, but the EU itself 
is also obliged to follow the UNSC Resolutions. The CFI ascertained that 
the blacklisting in the Resolutions (under the 1267-regime) had created an 
‘effect of legality’ due to the supreme nature of the UN Charter. To analyze 
the statement further, the Court is almost implying that the UNSC could 
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decide upon anything and the supremacy of the UN Charter would 
immediately grant the decision an ‘effect of legality’. Perhaps the ultimate 
test of the legitimacy of the UNSC Resolutions would be the acceptance of 
the Member States who are also members of the UN. If members of the UN 
would begin to oppose the UNSC more clamorously it might lead to an 
increasing respect for fundamental rights.    
 
However, in as much as Sweden has obligations under EU law to comply 
with the CFSP and Regulations of the EU, the EU itself is obliged to protect 
fundamental rights. The willingness is well illustrated in cases where the 
Community courts have to consider decisions taken by the EU itself, such as 
in the OMPI or Segi cases. Even if neither courts were able to review the 
legality of the decisions to freeze the funds of the individuals, due to lack of 
clear evidence for the listing in the case of the OMPI and a procedural 
failure in the Segi case, the Courts laid down that the right to a fair trial and 
judicial review were vital fundamental rights.  
 
The introduction of the EUCFR and the accession to the ECHR will most 
definitely create a better legal protection for fundamental rights in the EU, 
given Article 52(1) of the EUCFR as one example. The provision states that 
imitations to the protection of fundamental rights must be provided for by 
law. When acceding to the ECHR the Member States transfer powers to the 
EU institutions thus creating a duty for the institutions of the Union to 
acknowledge fundamental rights in every decision.  
 
Regarding the means for redress for Mr. Yusuf and Al Barakaat, Mr. Yusuf 
has the possibility of being compensated by the Swedish government ex-
gratia. However, considering the fact that the Swedish Government seems 
unwilling to challenge the UN and settle for simply stating that it does not 
agree with the decision to freeze the funds, I am not too optimistic. As 
regards the appeal by Al Barakaat which is still pending before the ECJ a 
possible redress seems more hopeful considering the Opinion of AG Poires 
Maduro.    
 
I believe that in the end it comes down to the question of how what kind of 
society we want to live in? The constant threat of terrorism has made 
institutions such as the UNSC to take on drastic measures to fight terrorism. 
It has gone so far that fundamental rights are completely omitted in the ‘war 
on terror’. Like Kruse, I believe that the ‘war on terror’ never can be won 
without the consent of ordinary citizens. The war will simply lack in 
credibility if one would maintain the same flagrant infringements of 
fundamental rights as we have seen up until today.     
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